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Cover: The placement of intelligence soldiers within CEWI symbolizes the integration of electronic warfare and intelligence assets at the tactical level. With the implementation of CEWI has come controversy, challenge and change. In this issue we take a candid look.

(U.S. Army Photos)

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Next Issue

In the next issue we'll take a look at Intelligence and Electronic Warfare doctrine in the forthcoming FM 34-1, Intelligence Preparation of the Air-Land Battlefield and the Principles of IEW. Also, look for the 124th MI Battalion's (CEWI) informative account of IEW at the National Training Center.

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Honorable John O. Marsh, Jr.
Secretary of the Army

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From the Commander



by Brig. Gen. Sidney T. Weinstein

In my first "Notes from the Commander," last issue, I indicated a commitment to reaffirming USAICS as the center of excellence for the military intelligence community. Below is an excerpt from a letter I received from an officer who visited Fort Huachuca recently. I include it as a report back to you, the men and women interested in the Intelligence Center and School, on where we stand in that endeavor.

"Dear General Weinstein:

I recently completed the Pre-Command Course and wanted to commend the staff and faculty on a first-class effort. We were greeted in a courteous manner, provided a menu of thought provoking classes, and treated like VIPs. [Staff members] did absolutely everything possible to see that we were provided the best support in and out of the classroom. All instructors . . . provided outstanding blocks of instruction and their excel-

lent personal attention combined to make our stay at Fort Huachuca very enjoyable and highly productive.

It is gratifying to observe such a high degree of efficiency and professionalism at the Center and School and it makes me proud to be a member of the Intelligence community. Please convey my thanks and congratulations to the staff and faculty for a job exceptionally well done.

Sincerely . . ."

This letter is only a small indicator, but one on which we certainly will build.

This issue of the MI Magazine contains material on two extremely important facets of military intelligence, the CEWI concept and a full report on the Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Systems Program Review held here at USAICS in October 1982. You all are familiar with the former, but an I-E-W-S-P-R is probably a new beast to most. There are special purposes in bringing CEWI and IEWSPR to you in this issue: One is to encourage an objective assessment and dialogue about the CEWI concept which has revolutionized military intelligence, another is that it is most important to share with you the scope of the issues that were addressed at the IEWSPR and to illuminate for you how the major directions for the future of MI are set for our slice of the Army.

The articles on CEWI represent the insights of some of the most experienced MI officers in the Army, as well as younger officers whose view of the concept is unaffected by pre-CEWI history. It is important for all these articles to be read constructively. If they evoke thoughts and perceptions which differ from those of the author, fine, but don't let it stop there.

As in the past, I encourage you to send your thoughts to the magazine—you may well help to shape the future of MI.

Equally, I encourage you to carefully review what happened in the 1982 IEWSPR. The three articles are condensed versions of the final reports presented to the Vice Chief of Staff by each of the three select panels. They address where we are in MI today and where we should be going. They speak to what the major challenges and problems are that stand in the course of progress and what can be done to remedy things. These articles are not just empty words. The IEWSPR produced an Action Plan upon which the Army staff will act.

Here are some of the other things that you can expect from USAICS in the immediate future. A doctrinal newsletter will be sent to major MI unit commanders so that a more field-oriented dialogue can be used to formulate military intelligence doctrine in the future. Look for an article on FM 34-1, the long awaited capstone doctrinal manual. Both the article and the manual will be out by the end of Fiscal Year 1983. You will also find information on new initiatives in training—advanced NCO education and entry-level officer training. You will see a preliminary report on the efforts of a counterintelligence task force convened here at USAICS. Information on what initial directions are being set under the newly established MI Specialty Proponency Office here at USAICS will also be forthcoming.

I think you can see that I intend for MI Magazine to be dynamic—as dynamic as the world of the MI professional. Help keep it that way. Where what you read is on the mark, let us know. More importantly, where you think it isn't, certainly let us know that as well. It all helps make the future better.

USAICS recently hosted the MI General Officer's conference sponsored by the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Maj. Gen. William E. Odom. During the conference, Odom was interviewed by 1Lt. Katherine L. Dooley, Editor, *MI Magazine*.

Q. With the changes in intelligence requirements and opportunities, how can an MI Officer enhance his/her career development?

A. Company grade MI officers should first focus very sharply on the tactical Army. They should know tactical doctrine, military history, and the entire business of AirLand warfare. They should know as much as they can about how foreign armies apply combat power to achieve campaign objectives in war. I think young MI officers today are being asked to know a lot more than any of their peers in the combat arms. As a company grade officer working in the G2 section of a division, an MI officer has to understand doctrine for the employment of the division in the attack, the defense, the delay, and all forms of operations that a division commander and G3 knows. If he does not have a clear comprehension of division, battalion, and company level operations, the MI officer will not be able to do highly effective work in intelligence production support to the G3 for operations.

After mastering the tactical arena, the MI officer should improve his general education. A foreign language is a great asset which will open many assignment opportunities. Economics, political science and other social sciences can be very useful in intelligence production and collection at the national and theater level. In addition to those specialized in social sciences, I see a greater need for MI officers who are strong in the physical sciences. In the past, we have predominately recruited officers

with social science backgrounds. Today the need for MI officers who can deal with technical and scientific issues is growing.

I have outlined a two-phased approach to MI officer career development. During the first phase, young officers should get to know the Army at the tactical level. During the second phase, the second five to eight years of service, officers should develop a secondary skill in great depth. It may be in a collection discipline such as HUMINT or SIGINT, expertise in CI or it may be foreign area expertise, operations research, ADP, or other specialties. By the 15th or 16th year of service, most MI officers will have completed their two-phased professional development. They will be field grade officers who have a broad understanding of military operations, not purely intelligence at the tactical level, and they will also have some specialty which is marketable and very much in demand at the higher staff levels.

Q. What is the greatest challenge of the MI branch?

A. I see two equally dominating challenges. The first, but not in order of importance, is intelligence support for operations at all tactical levels. I put great emphasis on this because the nature of the Threat changes year by year. The change in the Threat has put an enormous responsibility on intelligence to help keep the outcome of any potential conflict clearly in our favor. Our second challenge concerns our peacetime role in providing definitions of the Threat for evolution of our tactical doctrine and for the development and procurement of weapons and materiel. It is not enough to provide a static statement of the Threat; we must also give a comprehensive and dynamic appreciation of the Threat so that the materiel

ACSI Viewpoint



development process can develop and field systems that are up to the challenges which potential opponents pose with their latest weapons and organizations.

Q. Why was USAICS chosen to host the MI General Officer's conference?

A. I am interested in seeing that all those in Army intelligence look upon Fort Huachuca as the "Home of Intelligence." It's only proper that an MI General's conference take place at Army intelligence's home.

Q. What role does the military play in determining national strategy at joint and higher levels?

A. The military has to understand what our foreign policy commitments are, what the diplomacy and power of our potential adversaries confront us with and then decide how best to build adequate military power to support those commitments and that diplomacy. Ours is not the business of deciding what our foreign policy should be or what commitments we undertake; ours is the task of insuring that our diplomats are backed with

Continued on page 44

Some Personal Observations on the CEWI Concept



by Col. William E. Harmon

In 1976, Lt. Col. (now Brig. Gen.) Dudley Gordon formed the Army's first Combat Electronic Warfare Intelligence Battalion. It was designated the 522d, and was organic to the 2d Armored Division, Fort Hood, Texas. The battalion was initially tested on Exercise GALLANT CREW 77. I was fortunate enough to be the G2 of the 2d Armored Division at the time of this major reorganization.

DIVISIONAL INTELLIGENCE BEFORE CEWI

Prior to the formation of the 522d CEWI Battalion, the division was supported by the Combat Intelligence Company (Provisional), which was also an Army test unit. The Combat Intelligence Company contained only a portion of the intelligence gathering assets which, by doctrine, were to operate in the division area of operations in combat. The company was provisionally organized with ground surveillance radars from the maneuver battalions, and Vietnam-vintage unattended ground sensors from the division headquarters company. The balance of the company came from the divisional MI company. The division had no organic SIGINT/EW or signal security assets. The SIGINT/EW assets belonged to the corps' ASA battalion, and were available for support of the division in the field. The SIGSEC assets belonged to the SIGSEC Command. Control of the intelligence assets organic to the division which consisted only of the combat intelligence company, was fairly easy. However, the other intelligence assets, which belonged to vertical command organization such

as the SIGSEC Command and the Army Security Agency, were not responsive to daily taskings. This is not meant to imply that they were not professional organizations proficient in their mission; the fact was they were not organic to the division, and were considered "outsiders" when maneuvering with the division in the field. With this lash up of organic and supporting (not attached) assets, I was never confident that I would be able to orchestrate their collective efforts effectively to produce timely combat intelligence for an armored division.

This was also the conclusion of a very influential study conducted in the mid-70s under the direction of Maj. Gen. Ursano, director of management for the DA staff. This study, known as the Intelligence Organization and Stationing Study, had the objective of making recommendations to give the tactical commander positive control of the intelligence assets which supported him on the battlefield. One result of this study was the CEWI Battalion.

DIVISIONAL INTELLIGENCE AFTER CEWI

The 522d CEWI Battalion was formed in October 1976 from elements of the 303d ASA Battalion, the Combat Intelligence Company of the 2d Armored Division, and the SIGSEC Detachment from the SIGSEC Command. The CEWI battalion was first tested in March 1977 on Exercise GALLANT CREW at Fort Hood. The tactical intelligence provided by the 522d CEWI Battalion and the Cavalry Squadron to the tactical decisionmakers of the 2d Armored Division during GALLANT

CREW was the best ever received outside of combat. And, as the G2, I felt for the first time that I was in control of the collection effort. This was the "proof of the pudding" as far as I was concerned because an armored division is always on the move. Any successful tactical intelligence collection effort must be one step ahead of the lead elements of the division. During GALLANT CREW, the 2d Armored Division G3, Lt. Col. John Borgman, usually had one to two hours advanced notice of our opponent's next move. Needless to say, the G3 was as happy with the new CEWI concept as the G2 was.

Very early on, the Commanding General of the 2d Armored Division, Maj. Gen. George S. Patton, Jr., called Gordon and me to his office to discuss the organizational and operational concept of the CEWI battalion. Our discussions included the relationship between the G2 and the CEWI battalion commander. We concluded that the G2 had to be recognized by everyone as the principle intelligence advisor to the division commander, regardless of the dates of rank of the G2 and the CEWI battalion commander. We also agreed that the CEWI battalion commander was not a subordinate of the G2 anymore than the DISCOM commander is a subordinate of the G4. The G2 was a subordinate of the chief of staff and the CEWI battalion commander was a subordinate of the assistant division commander (maneuver). Patton's concluding question was, "What do I do if you two can't get along?" Gordon and I answered without hesitation, "Fire us both." That has been my

advice to my division and corps commanders ever since, regardless of whether I occupied the position of G2 or CEWI battalion/group commander.

Gordon and I discussed on numerous occasions what our respective rolls and missions were. We agreed from the start that the approaching field test of the CEWI concept was more important to the Army than either of us, and with that as a foundation we found immediate agreement in the majority of functional areas. There were areas that were not clear cut and required compromise on the part of both of us. Tactical intelligence is an extremely perishable product, and far too important to the saving of American soldier's lives on the battlefield to be jeopardized by personality conflicts or ego trips on the part of a self-centered G2 or CEWI commander. The division/corps commander is ultimately responsible for how well or poorly his tactical intelligence team functions, and if he chooses to allow it to deteriorate into an unprofessional environment, then he has only himself to blame—not the CEWI concept.

During the first year of its existence, there was much discussion about having the same individual serve concurrently as the G2 and the CEWI battalion commander. My experience in both positions says, "Absolutely not." Proponents of this idea used the example of the engineer battalion commander being the division engineer and the signal battalion commander being the division signal officer. The division engineer and division signal officer are, of course, special staff officers while the G2 is a principle staff officer.

The demands for time spent in the DTOC and the Forward TOC for a principle staff officer (G2) and those of a special staff officer vary considerably. If the G2 and the CEWI battalion commander were the same person, one or both duties would be neglected: if the individual was staff oriented, soldiers would be neglected; if command oriented, intelligence would be neglected. Neither situation is acceptable.

WHERE ARE WE NOW?

My experiences as a G2, both prior to and after the formation of the first CEWI battalion, and later

commanding and reorganizing the CEWI battalion to conform to the test recommendations have left me with some observations I would like to share.

Equipment:

The formation of the CEWI battalion did not create new problems, it merely surfaced some concerning SIGINT/EW equipment and training which had been in a dormant state for too long. It moved the problems from the strategic-oriented Army Security Agency to the tactical-oriented combat division, where, for the first time, the division commanders of the Army were to become very involved with the maintainability of the MLQ-24 and TLQ-17, because these pieces of equipment now belonged to them.

Training:

The CEWI battalion is the only element in the division that can train the division in an environment similar to that which an enemy force will impose upon it. This is due, of course, to the non-lethality of EW. This places us in a unique position: all divisional elements train themselves to be part of the division; we alone can train the division. This causes a dilemma for the CEWI battalion commander, because he has to maintain a delicate balance between the time spent training the division and that dedicated to individual and team intelligence skills. I once failed to maintain that balance, and my soldiers suffered until I could get it back in proper perspective, and that took almost three months.

Team Effort:

There is only one senior intelligence officer by function at the division and corps level, and that is the G2. There is also only one senior intelligence commander by function at the division and corps level, and that is the CEWI commander. There is room for two MI lieutenant colonels at division and two MI colonels at corps because the job is too big for one, but they must work as a team.

The cost of the CEWI concept has been substantial, however, this type

of organization is absolutely vital if we are to cure the ills of a long neglected all-source tactical intelligence system and its equipment. Some of the very tangible advantages of the CEWI concept are:

Improved Intelligence Support:

We train as a team at division and corps to produce a better intelligence product, which is of course the purpose of our existence. That very team effort will result in a fused all-source product because we are all part of the same organization. All the memorandums of understanding in the world will not produce the teamwork like that found in a well-led CEWI organization where everyone wears the same unit patch with pride.

Better Training:

We are training our soldiers better. Intelligence training is very difficult due to the low density of soldiers in a given MOS, and the high level of skill required. They possess some very perishable skills that need constant fine tuning. REDTRAIN has proven to be an effective technique for helping maintain proficiency. We are also on the brink of sophisticated training aids such as video disk with microprocessor interfaces. Assisting in the development of these aids will be the soldiers who currently have the skills, and who possess an understanding of the complexity of the training requirement.

Leadership Opportunities:

Due to our training challenge, we are showing others innovative ways in which to train. Our highly skilled NCOs and warrants are demonstrating what MI officers have known all along—that our highly skilled technicians are leaders, too, when given the opportunity.

Communications:

Whether acknowledged or not, all successful tactical intelligence collection and dissemination efforts owe their success to an equally successful communications effort. The CEWI commander has almost as many radio and teletype rigs as the signal battalion/brigade. This dictates that the

CEWI commander's actual alternate career specialty is signal while in command, regardless of what MILPERCEN has put in the computer. This fact of operational existence has forced us to be much more efficient and realistic in our operational planning, which has resulted in the intelligence circuits having a higher priority in the establishment of the division/corps/EAC circuits. The best intelligence ever collected is worthless if its timeliness is lost for want of a circuit to the user.

User Oriented Development:

We are a combat support branch and CEWI allows us to demonstrate that in a more positive way than ever before. The division and corps commanders are very concerned with the survivability and maintainability of our IEW equipment. They have insisted that the Army test our new equipment in the environment in which it will operate and be supported, which means tested in the CEWI organizations where our highly skilled leader/technicians can be heard. That is a real plus, because we are now in control of our destiny; soldiers will be able to state their specific needs, with survivability and maintainability taking precedent over the contractor's favorite design. The soldier involved in the collection of tactical intelligence may pay for design mistakes with his/her life, so he/she should have a say in how that equipment is designed, inside and out.

Professional Development:

CEWI gives us the opportunity to serve at the tactical level from PFC to CSM, WO1 to CWO 4, 2nd Lt. to Col., in a CEWI unit or G2 section. That translates to experience and opportunity. We do not need to send our lieutenants to a combat arms detail; we can train them better in CEWI organizations with equally challenging leadership positions. A balance is needed, and every intelligence professional should also serve in strategic assignments in order to perform more efficiently at the tactical level. By having a complete understanding of the total


intelligence picture, one can provide a more complete picture of the deep battle by properly tasking for support from echelons above corps, other services, and the national assets.

WHERE ARE WE GOING:

Considering these tangible advantages where are we headed? What does the future hold for tactical intelligence?

Quality Tactical Intelligence:

The soldiers in CEWI organizations today should be a source of



pride to everyone associated with Military Intelligence branch. There is being developed a branch of intelligence professionals who understand tactical intelligence and the needs of the combat commander better than the combat commanders. That was not the case just a few short years back. How many of you have heard a division or corps commander say recently he wants his G2 or CEWI battalion commander to be any branch other than MI? The prestige of MI branch as a corps of professionals will continue to grow as long as we, as a branch and as individuals, are willing to continue to make the sacrifices necessary to support the combat arms on the battlefield.

By concentrating the talents of so many professionals in fatigues we cannot help but have more closely coordinated operations and approaches to training. The innovations of leaders at the company level is a source of strength. What the senior leadership of the Army must do is

ensure the system of procurement is streamlined to support innovation as opposed to discourage initiative, as is now the case.

Improved Support Forward:

The CEWI group at corps level will continue to improve its ability to support forward and to complement divisional assets with the aerial exploitation battalion, the tactical exploitation battalion, and push forward products from echelons above corps and the tactical interfaces to national assets found in the operations battalion.

User Definition for ASAS:

Soldiers will define the structure of automated files and the final configuration of the frequently discussed, but never seen, automated All-Source-Analysis-System. Today we are defining our requirements, not in white smocks, but in fatigues in manual all-source-analysis environments. And more importantly, it is being done by the people who will eventually be called upon to do the job when the automated version arrives. CEWI organizations with microprocessors are teaching intelligence analysts to solve their own problems by becoming programmers as opposed to waiting for contractors to teach civilian programmers to be intelligence analysts. Feedback to the ASAS developers from the field will be invaluable. The tactical soldier will have a very strong voice in the development of the all important automated ASAS, which we so desperately need. This will result in a realistic automation architecture, and its connectivity will be based on realistic communications within the realm of possibility at the division and corps level.

CONCLUSION

There has been some criticism of the CEWI concept and not without justification. But having lived with the alternative to the CEWI concept for the first half of my career, I much prefer a concept that puts the tactical commander in complete charge of the tactical intelligence assets operating in his area of operations.

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That, at least, gives the G2 a fighting chance of organizing the collection effort and disseminating the intelligence in a timely manner.



Col. William E. Harmon was commissioned in Infantry in July 1960 from Arkansas Polytechnic College. As a company grade officer he served in command and staff positions with the 101st Airborne Division, I Corps (Group), Korea, 11th Air Assault Division, JFK Center for Special Warfare, 5th Special Forces Group (Vietnam), and the 525th Military Intelligence Group (Vietnam). As a field grade officer, Harmon served in staff positions with the Headquarters, U.S. Army Pacific, Military Assistance Command Vietnam, as an exchange officer with the British Ministry of Defense (London), G2, 2d Armored Division, commanded the 203d MI Company (Corps) and the 522d CEWI Battalion, served on the Department of the Army Staff, and as Deputy G2 XVIII Airborne Corps. He holds a Masters Degree in International Relations from the University of Southern California, and is a graduate of the U.S. Army War College. Harmon has commanded the 525th Military Intelligence Group (CEWI) since January 1981.

MI or CEWI?

by Mark Faulk

There is a great deal of confusion over the use of the terms "MI" and "CEWI." This confusion leads to a misuse of them which only perpetuates the cycle of indefinite intelligence jargon development and use. There are three terms which are the current forerunners in this conundrum. They are MI, CEWI and IEW (intelligence and electronic warfare).

A very brief history may be useful. In 1975, the Intelligence Organization and Stationing Study was conducted to combine many of the Army Security Agency tactical capabilities with the existing tactical intelligence support system into one organization which would provide responsive organic electronic warfare and intelligence support to combat commanders. To emphasize this melding, the term "combat electronic warfare and intelligence" was coined. CEWI became synonymous with the idea that ASA was no more and that the field commander now had one intelligence system to support him at the tactical level. Thus were born CEWI battalions and CEWI groups as TOE units. This news is almost 10 years old. Few in the Army today think in terms other than the single intelligence system designed for tactical echelons.

CEWI was never a term designed to replace MI. It was a term used to convey the concept of integration of MI at the tactical level with what was previously tactical ASA. Once accomplished, CEWI, as a term, should have self-destructed. Unfortunately, it did not, and, as so often happens with acronyms, it now perpetuates itself.

It is now the duty of the intelligence community and consumers of intelligence service to make every

effort to remove the term CEWI from our lexicon. The only place the term is legitimately used is in the TOE title of specified military intelligence organization such as the "Military Intelligence Battalion (CEWI) (Division)." Any other use of the term is inappropriate. There are no CEWI organizations, CEWI assets, CEWI resources, CEWI operations or CEWI personnel. There are only MI organizations, assets, resources, operations and personnel. And only MI provides the support a commander needs. The doctrine for MI is being written this way and we must think, speak and write this way.

IEW is another term which cries for elimination. It is also a term born out of the need to mesh tactical intelligence and selected electronic warfare and signals intelligence capabilities at tactical echelons. As is the case with CEWI, IEW has been a helpful term, but has now outlived its usefulness.

So how should intelligence and other personnel refer to what is commonly referred to as CEWI or IEW? Military Intelligence! MI is a broad enough term to include such things as intelligence, signals intelligence and electronic warfare. It is also flexible enough to include functions performed by non-MI branch personnel or units, e.g. reconnaissance patrolling conducted by forward deployed combat elements.

The Army has one system to provide commanders and decision makers with intelligence, multidisciplined counterintelligence and electronic warfare support, and that is the military intelligence system supported by both MI and non-MI personnel.

C³I = CEWI

(A Combat Arms Officer's Perspective)

by Maj. Donald A. MacGuish

Combat arms officers have traditionally concentrated their efforts and acquired proficiency in command, control, and communications. They have, all too frequently, failed to realize the capabilities of intelligence activities and analyses. The reason we have failed in this area is difficult to assess. Perhaps we have associated intelligence with spies and betrayal of one's country; or perhaps we still have the attitude that "gentlemen do not read other gentlemen's mail."

Combat arms officers should read F.W. Winterbotham's book, *The Ultra Secret*. After getting past the author's prejudices, one should note and then contrast two persons. One ignored his intelligence, the other capitalized on it. Both fought the same foe. One never tasted defeat while the other constantly had to seize the enemy's strongest positions. The characters, of course, were Patton and Montgomery.

If you are a combat arms officer, are you a Patton using all of your intelligence resources, or do you, like Montgomery, give it little credibility and ignore it? If you are an intelligence officer, do you educate your fellow officers or do you simply complain about how little "they" understand your product?

CEWI represents a challenge to both the combat arms officer and the intelligence officer. The success of their communications will determine the ultimate success of CEWI and our performance on the battlefield. It is unfortunate that CEWI has been plagued with personnel shortages and equipment system failures. The concept is, in my opinion, both valid and necessary on the electromagnetic battlefield.

It is absolutely imperative that the combat arms officer exert a severe demand on his intelligence assets. Intelligence, through CEWI, can be a force multiplier. I would like to present a model CEWI organization that could be easily task organized to meet mission requirements as well as the needs of the combat arms commander.

The CEWI battalion, as proposed, would be comprised of five companies. The structure calls for a headquarters and operations company, an intelligence company, a surveillance and reconnaissance company, an electronic warfare company, and a service support company.

The headquarters and operations company includes the battalion staff and the respective staff sections which perform those personnel, intelligence, operations/training and supply tasks normally associated with those sections. The company also includes the company headquarters which accomplishes the administrative functions of the organization. The third element of the company is the operations section which is comprised of the operations element and the division tactical operations support element.

The operations element works closely with the division G3 and CEWI battalion S3 tasking, supervising, and orchestrating the intelligence assets in accomplishing the assigned tasks. This element is responsible for coordination of all division organic and assigned intelligence assets and is the primary interface with the corps MI group (CEWI). The division tactical operations center support element assists the operations element in the intelligence coordination effort. Located

in the DTOC, this element passes division taskings to the operations element for processing and implementation.

The DTOC support element is divided into five sections in order to facilitate intelligence tasking, collection, processing, and reporting. The collection management and dissemination section accepts tasks from the G2, passes the information to the operations element, and provides rapid dissemination of intelligence and target development data. The electronic warfare section works closely with the division's EW staff officers in the planning and management of EW missions. The all source production section is where all levels of classified data is analyzed, processed, correlated, and integrated into a product which supports the division commander's needs. The tactical command post section is composed of a small team of intelligence analysts who process intelligence at the tactical command post. The weather section is an Air Force-augmented organization which analyzes weather data and issues weather information.

This type of headquarters organization would be able to easily support division operations. Since the mission requires the company to be decentralized, this type of organization facilitates that type of arrangement. In addition, command and control of operations is easily accomplished.

The second company in this CEWI battalion is the intelligence company which coordinates the activities of the analysts and security sections. The company headquarters provides those routine administrative services normally associated with all com-

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Military Intelligence

The Divisional CEWI Battalion: A Case For Reorganization

by Maj. A.J. Paluska, Jr.

Current CEWI battalion doctrine (FM 34-10) dictates that electronic warfare and ground surveillance radar companies provide one platoon apiece in support of each brigade. To coordinate the activities of these platoons, an intelligence electronic warfare element, consisting of one officer and one NCO, performs liaison with the supported brigade commander and his staff. Technical direction and material support are provided by the headquarters headquarters and operations company and the service support company respectively.

Doctrinally, HHOC and the service support company are deployed in the vicinity of the CEWI battalion headquarters, located near division main in the division support area. The EW and GSR platoons are located forward in the brigade area, with the IEW element at the brigade tactical operations center. The EW and GSR company commanders, located with the battalion headquarters, are forced to control their widely separated units over a division width and depth, depending on intelligence/EW unique material/maintenance services from a sister unit responsible for supporting the same area. Two company commanders are responsible for key intelligence support to three brigade commanders. As proven by CEWI operations in Europe, control of small units over large division fronts, communications difficulties, time consuming travel, and coordination of support with different commanders and staffs taxed the battalion's organizational structure. Additionally, Quickfix (a heliborne intercept and jamming system) and Trailblazer (an automated collection and


direction finding system), key divisional SIGINT/EW assets, are assigned to separate companies, HHOC and EW respectively. Although these assets can support individual brigades selectively, due to their employment characteristics, they are best employed in general support of the division. Also, CEWI battalion organization allotted a DTOC support element to the CEWI battalion HHOC. The USAF staff weather office was also attached. The personnel in these elements work for the G2 and G3 and not for the CEWI battalion. Consequently, they should be assigned to division HHC.

Reorganization will eliminate the above weaknesses while retaining flexibility and maintaining support to

the maneuver brigade. Under this new organization one multi-disciplined brigade support company supports each brigade. The unit commander is in the brigade area, located with the brigade TOC, thus eliminating the need for the IEW element. The unit is self-supporting. Additional support can be obtained through the brigade FASCO, when necessary. Each brigade has its own CEWI unit for support when it goes to the field. Each CEWI company commander can better control his unit since span of control is lessened. One commander controls a brigade width/depth instead of two commanders controlling a division width/depth. Communications are better because distances are decreased. Better

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PROPOSED CEWI BATTALION ORGANIZATION



Continued page 11

pany size units. The technical control and analysis center continues to provide those supervisory functions normally associated with the TCAC (e.g. first level SIGINT translation, inscription, and analysis). The TCAC is made up of an ELINT Analysis Team which analyzes noncommunications data, a traffic analysis team which analyzes communications data, and a cryptographic analysis team which analyzes cryptographic data.

The intelligence support platoon is made up of a headquarters section, a technical intelligence team, three counterintelligence teams, and three interrogation/translation teams. The counterintelligence teams provide the division with an organic counterintelligence capability. The interrogation teams are responsible for the interrogation of prisoners of war and the translation of captured documents. These activities are primarily for screening information of immediate intelligence value to the division. More intensive interrogation and complete translation of documents is accomplished at higher levels.

The other team of the intelligence platoon is the technical intelligence team. Current doctrine only provides for organic technical intelligence assets at echelons above corps. TI teams are to be dispatched to subordinate units as needed. A fluid battlefield and active/mobile defense operations will make this arrangement difficult to implement. In addition, current doctrine places a greater burden on the division commander to use his initiative to take advantage of situations on the "high tech" battleground. In order for the division commander to be successful he must have a greater organic intelligence capability at his disposal. The TI team is only one element that will provide him with this increased capability.

The TI team will not only provide quick evaluation and analysis of enemy equipment, but it will provide EAC TI assets with an initial screening apparatus for evacuation decisions. Other TI units would provide a more comprehensive analysis than this team could perform. Instead of relying on input from nontechnical intelligence trained personnel, EAC TI teams would make evacuation

decisions and be able to locate their limited TI resources based on quality information.

The third company is organized as a surveillance and reconnaissance company. The company headquarters section performs its normal mission. The ground surveillance platoon is comprised of a headquarters and ten ground surveillance radar teams. It is expected that new radar surveillance systems such as the foliage penetration radar will ensure the viability of surveillance devices being organic to division level units. The company organization also provides for augmentation of a remote sensor platoon, with a headquarters and up to ten, three-man REMS teams when the situation warrants. The continued research and development of remote sensing devices and the remote battlefield sensor system will result in altering the REMS augmentation concept to that of a permanent structure within this CEWI battalion.

The other platoon in this company is the reconnaissance platoon. I realize that the cavalry squadron has a reconnaissance mission, but it also has screening, security, covering force, and similar vital duties that preclude it from use as a reconnaissance force only. The reconnaissance platoon gives the division commander an organic reconnaissance unit, the primary mission of which is to conduct intelligence reconnaissance. The secondary mission of this unit is to provide security for elements of the electronic warfare company, especially the jamming elements. Although it is

assumed that the combat arms commander will dispatch some of his troops for this mission it is very unlikely that he would be able to spare his vital resource, manpower, for an assignment of this nature. It is also erroneous to assume that the various EW teams will be able to provide their own security most of the time, thus the need for a security contingent capable of supporting the EW effort.

The electronic warfare company contains the battalion's ground jamming and intercept assets. This unit integrates the typical company headquarters section, an intercept platoon equipped with the Trailblazer which is capable of both jamming and intercept missions, a jamming platoon equipped with both TACJAM and AN/TLQ-17s and a noncommunications collection platoon equipped with AN/MLQ-24. The mechanics of unit mission tasking would be similar to that of the division's organic artillery assets.

The last company is the service support company. This unit fulfills the support requirements of the CEWI battalion. Among the support functions are food service for the battalion, communications center operations, communications equipment maintenance, and vehicle maintenance. The only difficulty with this unit is its enormity. Unfortunately, there is little reorganization that logically can be made to reduce the inherent command and control difficulties of such a large body.

This model organization provides the division with a flexible and effective intelligence battalion which is

Technical Intelligence Team

Team Leader	O-3	35X5F
Land Combat Missile Sys Repair Tech		271A0
Communications Electronics Repair Tech		287A0
Armament Maintenance Tech		421A0
Engineer Equipment Analyst		621A0
Automotive Repair Tech		630A0
Senior Intelligence Sergeant	E-8	96B5A
Field Radio Repairman	E-7	31E4A
Senior Aircraft Maintenance Sergeant	E-7	67Z4A
Medical Specialist	E-7	91B4A
NBC Specialist	E-6	54E3A
Ammunition Inspector	E-6	55X3A
Track Vehicle Repairer	E-6	63H3A
Administrative Specialist	E-4	71L20
Preservation and Packing Specialist	E-4	76V20
Still Photographer Specialist	E-4	84B20

truly capable of producing all-source intelligence and conducting electronic warfare. The organization can support the division during independent operations and in an active/mobile defensive environment. The CEWI battalion, as configured, allows for mission tasking and is easily restructured for air assault, airborne, and special operations.

The CEWI battalion presented is designed to be used by both active and reserve components. The reserve forces have a unique manpower and training problem. The five-company organization provides for those unique manning and training difficulties found in the reserves. The major problems with this organization is training in a "live" environment. These problems can be overcome with the use of INSCOM and control, processing, analysis and reporting training materials and methods. If the unit is going to be deployed in a decentralized manner, why not train in this mode? Admittedly, secure operations facilities would virtually eliminate these problems.

This CEWI battalion provides a degree of standardization that will enable the reserves to respond to active component needs in a time of crisis. The active Army needs the reserves to fill its depleted human resources. Standardization of active and reserve organizations will facilitate the integration of reserves into active Army units during mobilization. It will also assist in the conduct of live environment training.

This organization also satisfies the basic interoperability requirements of both active and reserve component units. One major critical node in active/reserve interaction is the similarity of structure which facilitates the integration of these components during mobilization. In the October-December 1980 issue of "Military Intelligence" magazine, Maj. Charles Wood and Lt. Steve Boyack proposed a Reserve Component CEWI Battalion. Although their proposal may have some merit with regards to training difficulties it would, I believe, impact on the active/reserve integration node. The greater flexibility provided by the similarity of structure far outweighs the training difficulties discussed in

that article. In addition, Capstone interaction and Redtrain activities are facilitated under a model concept.

The prudent combat arms officer will learn to employ his CEWI assets in a effective and efficient manner. He will know its capabilities and limitations, using it as the force multiplier that it is. The energetic intelligence officer will attend to make the combat arms officer aware of the capability available so that he can properly use this valuable asset. Communicative dialogue will make more "Pattons" than "Montgomeries." This CEWI battalion provides both active and reserve components with a standardized and flexible intelligence asset.

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The Divisional CEWI Battalion

coordination with the brigade S2/S3 makes GSR/EW support more responsive to the brigade commander's needs. Reorganization places general support assets, such as Trailblazer and Quickfix, in a separate unit which can best provide that type of support. Personnel supporting the G2, G3 are assigned to them. The CEWI battalion commander now controls one company in support of each brigade, not separate platoons under the direction of different company commanders. As these advantages show, a CEWI battalion thus organized is the best way to provide support to the AIM divisions.

A similar organization was used by the 501st MI Battalion (CEWI), 1st Armored Division, in 1980. Problems encountered were a result of equipment/personnel constraints, not organization. This concept was tested at the Hohenfels Major Training Area in August 1980, and during REFORGER Exercise Certain Rampart in September 1980. Garrison organization followed current CEWI battalion guidelines, except that motor maintenance personnel were attached to each company.

The CEWI battalion has proven to be more flexible than any intelligence organization previously fielded because it is self contained, and provides more responsive EW/intelligence support than ever before. With the battalion reorganized as proposed, it can better provide the effective EW/intelligence support envisioned in the CEWI concept and promised by current organization. Responsive and effective intelligence support is the key, and now is the time to reorganize to provide the best support possible for the future.

NOTE: This article is based primarily on experience gained while assigned as S2, 16th Engineer Battalion, GSR company commander, and S3, 501st MI Battalion (CEWI), 1st Armored Division, Germany, 1978-1981.

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CEWI Supports the Division Staff

by Maj. Patrick H. McGuire

The military intelligence assets in a division were first organized into Combat Electronic Warfare and Intelligence battalions in 1977. At that time, an additional military intelligence lieutenant colonel was placed in the division as the CEWI battalion commander, competing with the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2 and Assistant Chief of Staff, G3 for control of military intelligence assets. This creation of multiple authority over military intelligence assets without specific doctrine for control has caused conflict within the DTOC Support Element of the Headquarters and Operations Company.

The mission of DSE is to assist the division G2 and G3 staff in the areas of electronic warfare, intelligence production, and OPSEC. To accomplish its mission, DSE is organized into four sections: collection management and dissemination, intelligence production, electronic warfare, and OPSEC management and analysis.

The G2 provides staff supervision for CM&D and IPS, and the G3 for EWS and OPSEC M&A. Operational tasking for all sections comes from these division staff officers, while the manning, training and equipment readiness are the responsibility of the CEWI battalion commander.

The Chief of DSE (a major) must respond to three lieutenant colonels with diverse and often conflicting demands on his section. Efficiency is lost as he attempts to cope with the priorities of his commander and completion of tasks for the coordinating staff.

Personnel within DSE have projects such as EW annexes, intelligence estimates, and OPSEC surveys that must be completed by the suspense date for the G2/G3. At the same time, maintenance must be performed on vehicles and generators, mandatory classes such as NBC must be attended, and additional duties such as CQ and SDO must be performed.

The Chief, DSE has a composite of tasks to perform, but does not have the power to fulfill them. He is also placed in the tenuous position of prioritizing the needs of three lieutenant colonels.

In some divisions, the Chief, DSE works for the battalion commander while in others, he works directly for the G2. The IPS is integrated into the G2 office or it may be in the battalion area. The officer in charge of the OPSEC M&A section may work directly under the supervision of

Four Sections of DSE

- Collection management and dissemination
 - Intelligence production
 - Electronic warfare
 - OPSEC management and analysis
-


an officer in the G2 or G3 sections. (All demonstrated the need to establish doctrine standardizing the relationship between DSE and the division staff so that both the intelligence functions and support requirements can be accomplished with the most efficient use of personnel and equipment.)

CEWI support to a division is not different from other technical support such as engineer, communications, and aviation. The division specialists in these areas hold the dual positions of special staff officers and battalion commanders. The special staff functions are delegated to an assistant who is the Assistant Division Engineer, Assistant Division Aviation Officer, etc. This system allows the commander to be aware of all requirements placed on his unit. He can assure that all missions

are accomplished including balancing operational and support requirements. The organizational concept for the CEWI battalion should be the same as the other technical support battalions. The CEWI battalion commander should hold the additional title of Division CEWI Support Officer and the Chief, DSE should also be the Assistant CEWI Support Officer.

Representatives from the CMD, IPS, EWS, and OPSEC M&A would be in the ADCSO office which would make expertise in any area available to the coordinating staff officer. The OIC's of the sections would be tasked directly by the G2/G3 operations officer. The daily contact of the OIC would allow him to be aware of the G2/G3 priorities. The ADCSO would balance G2/G3 requirements with those of the battalion commander and keep him informed of operational tasking. He could cross-level requirements of his sections to insure that all missions were accomplished. If a conflict did arise, he could task other CEWI assets through the battalion S3. The ADCSO would have the same special staff status as the ADE or ADCEO. As a member of a division orders group, he would be part of any initial planning for an operation. This would allow the DSE and the battalion to be aware of requirements at the beginning of the staff planning sequence to provide better support.

Responsiveness to both the division staff and battalion commander would also be reflected in the rating scheme. The OIC's of each DSE section would be rated by the ADCSO who is directly responsible for all their activities. The intermediate rater would be the G2 or G3 staff officer who the OIC must satisfy with his sections product. The senior rater would be the CEWI battalion commander who is responsible for everything his people do or fail to do. The rating scheme for the ADCSO would be the CEWI battal-



ion commander, rater; the intermediate rater, G2; and senior rater, ADCS or ADCO depending upon who the battalion commander's rater is.

The centralization of military intelligence assets into CEWI battalions has proven to be a valid concept which provides a division commander with the best intelligence and electronic warfare support possible. However, doctrine needs to be standardized not only for the operations within the battalion but also for the external relationship with the division staff. Conflicts which have developed have unnecessarily hampered military intelligence support to the tactical commander. Adoption

of the ADCSO system would alleviate these problems and standardize CEWI support throughout the Army.

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Cryptocorner

The solution to the cryptogram is as follows:

Four soldiers on weight program argued who was doing best.

MSG Mound: The most rank lost the most pounds.

SGT Suet: Mound, Corpus or Portly lost most weight.

CPL Corpus: Portly, Suet or myself lost most pounds.

PFC Portly: Only two of us speak truly.

Who lost most?

ABCDEFGHIJKLMN O PQRSTU VWXYZ
FATMENSCLUBZYXWVRQPOKJIHGD

BICC—Continued from page 15

ing chores from which no section can escape. Nevertheless, although his emphasis on the BICC periodically puts a rather severe strain on the capabilities of the S2 section, it does ensure that future operations are given the attention they require. In short, it allows the S2 section to become a true intelligence production facility rather than another staff section through which reports and requests are filtered.

It is clear that a separate BICC offers a number of advantages to a brigade. It makes possible the psychological and physical isolation for the intelligence analyst which is essential for detailed planning. The frenetic activity and cramped conditions which often prevail in the TOC preclude this type of contingency planning. Even more important, a BICC configured in this manner allows the S2 section to avoid total absorption in the present battle and permits it to focus on the future battle. As we have seen, this is of paramount importance on the modern extended battlefield. The separate BICC will be able to study the possible courses of action of the second echelon regiments and divisions and discover their vulnerabilities better than the conventional S2 section. The separate BICC gives the brigade S2 an enhanced capability to do what the brigade S2 is supposed to do but seldom does.

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Brigade BICC Operations

by Capt. Arthur T. Coumbe

Currently, there appears to be a great deal of doctrinal uncertainty about the roles and functions of the brigade battlefield information coordination center. Pertinent doctrinal literature on this subject does not clearly state what capabilities the BICC is supposed to add to the intelligence production capacity of the brigade S2 section, nor is an attempt made to create for the BICC its own functional niche within the brigade tactical operations center. Available guidance on brigade BICC operations merely provides a list of functions for which the S2 has traditionally been responsible. From a study of relevant publications, it is not at all certain that the BICC should be functionally distinct or that it was ever intended to be.

The BICC concept was apparently introduced to provide the maneuver brigade and battalion with the same capabilities, although at a reduced scale, that the all-source intelligence center and the collection management and distribution furnish to the division G2. While this idea certainly has merit, doctrinal turbidity and chronic personnel shortages and turbulence often result in the BICC being deemphasized or even ignored at the brigade level. In fact, it is probable that if a random

sample of brigade S2s were asked to define the roles and functions of their BICCs, many would be hard pressed to produce more than a very vague and general outline of the BICC areas of responsibility.

It appears that in many brigades the BICC is either entirely dead or is submerged so deep within the TOC that it has no real identity of its own. To remedy this situation and maxi-

... In many brigades the BICC is either entirely dead or is submerged so deep within the TOC that it has no real identity of its own.

mize the capabilities of the brigade BICC, consideration should be given to organizing the TOC in a slightly unconventional way. Instead of having the BICC co-located with the S2 (and being lost in the TOC), the BICC should not only be given a different focus than its parent section, but should also be housed in a separate facility. This physical and functional separation not only quantitatively increases intelligence production but provides the commander with a more timely and useful product. The purpose of this article is to point out the major roles and functions of a "separate" BICC

and to outline some advantages of this configuration.

In a TOC arranged as proposed above, the brigade S2 section concentrates on current operations while the BICC devotes most of its attention to the battle 12 to 18 hours in the future. The S2 can be viewed as being concerned with the brigade area of influence while the BICC is concerned chiefly with the brigade area of interest. To accomplish this mission, the BICC must be able to perform a number of functions.

One of the most important functions of the BICC is to conduct a detailed and timely intelligence preparation of the battlefield for future operations. Terrain analysis, trafficability studies, delineation of avenues of approach, identification of key terrain, cover and concealment overlays, obstacle overlays and terrain masking diagrams are all part of the IPB process for the future battle. All of these IPB products (often left undone in the wake of conflicting priorities in a TOC without a separate BICC) are extremely valuable to operators when they consider possible future courses of action. Other specific task performed by the BICC include construction of target profiles, compilation and maintenance of intelligence collection charts and overlays, track-

ing enemy losses (both vehicle and personnel), and upkeep of the brigade commander's intelligence briefing charts and overlays. The BICC also plays a major role in formulating the brigade's surveillance plans, providing input for the employment of ground surveillance radars and patrols, and in planning the use of those collection assets organic to division, corps and echelon above corps. Although most S2 shops address most of the tasks and analytical tools listed above, many sections are not able to give them the careful and systematic consideration they require if they are to be of any real use to the rest of the staff.

While the BICC concentrates on the future battle, the S2 section focuses on current operations. Functions of the S2 include maintenance of the current intelligence situation map, developing the brigade surveillance plan and managing the brigade's surveillance assets, coordination of the intelligence requirements of subordinate battalions, interface with the other staff elements and representatives of service and service support units, establishing EEI/OIR, integration of IEW element into brigade tactical operations, collecting and disseminating weather information, producing periodic situation summaries, and the coordination of collection efforts. It is the S2 section which also receives and edits the spot reports from the subordinate battalions, processes them and forwards the refined information to the next higher headquarters.

It is quite obvious from the list of outlined functions that there is a great deal of overlap between the responsibilities of the S2 section and the BICC. The BICC cannot hermetically seal itself off from the rest of the TOC and hope to be of any real value to the other staff sections. Neither can it dogmatically restrict its focus to the 12 to 18 hour timeframe mentioned earlier. On the other hand, a certain degree of isolation is essential if there is to be a thorough consideration of future contingencies. This is true for a number of reasons.

First, a BICC totally absorbed in coordinating and directing the current battle does not produce a cli-

mate which fosters planning. Coordinating present exigencies with other staff sections, posting the situation map, responding to the urgent demands of subordinate S2s, etc., often leaves the brigade S2 with little time and few resources to evaluate future requirements. Add to this the confusion and frenetic activity which sometimes prevails in the TOC at the most critical periods in the battle and it is quite clear that looking ahead to future operations is not high on the list of priorities. Often only the bare rudiments of the planning process are initiated. A "separate" BICC will ensure that at least a few intelligence analysts are free to look at future operations in an environment which is psychologically conducive to this type of detailed and time consuming work. The separate BICC facility will ensure that the future battle is not obscured in the fog of the present.

One function of the BICC is to conduct a detailed and timely intelligence preparation of the battlefield for future operations.

Another advantage to a BICC set apart from the TOC is that it will allow for adequate work space to produce graphics from which the operational plans and overlays are drawn up. The conventionally arranged TOC complex certainly does not lend itself to the production of detailed and precise intelligence products. Many overlays and graphic aids constructed in a conventional TOC are developed in cramped conditions. Not only is this psychologically unsuitable for planning, but it substantially detracts from the accuracy, intelligibility and neatness of the derived product. A separate BICC facility furnishes the requisite work area where a higher quality product can be manufactured. This not only creates more work space for the other staff sections, but gives them a more precise and usable product on which they may base their planning.

The relative separation of the brigade BICC is a critical factor in light of the intelligence requirements of today's extended battlefield. Gen.

Donn Starry, in his recent article "Extending the Battlefield," suggests the need at brigade level for the fusion of information derived from various intelligence sources and the integration of this refined data into interdiction targeting. He identifies this capability as a prerequisite for exploiting enemy vulnerabilities. Only a brigade BICC with a certain degree of detachment from the TOC will have the time or the requisite environment to systematically address this demanding task.

The separate BICC facility will ensure that the future battle is not obscured in the fog of the present.

One possible objection to this BICC arrangement is that it isolates intelligence planners of the future battle from their counterparts in the other staff sections, especially the operators. One could view this arrangement as aggravating an already bad situation in which the various staff sections work in isolation. A possible remedy for this dilemma would involve stationing S1, S3 and S4 representatives in the BICC, thus promoting the intelligence analyst/operator/logistician interface which is necessary for effective planning. The S1/3/4 representatives would not have to be present in the BICC on a continual basis but should be there at critical times in the planning cycle. This would help ensure that the products of the BICC are integrated into the contingency planning process of the other staff sections.

A separate BICC might be difficult to establish without adequate manning levels. For the BICC to be effective, at least one-half of the assigned strength of the S2 section should be assigned to the BICC section. However, this does create problems for the relatively small remnant of the S2 section who will at times be hard pressed to keep up with the current situation, post the situation map, respond to requests of the subordinate battalions and take care of the myriad of tasks which managing the current battle entails. These difficulties are compounded by the many work details and housekeep-

Reserve Component CEWI—Dead or Alive?

by Capt. Curtis R.
Bartholomew

The life and death struggle for the formation of CEWI units in the reserve goes on. MI and ASA units fight daily for survival and face extinction due to a lack of equipment, skilled personnel and secure facilities to conduct meaningful training. Establishing CEWI units using these MI and ASA units as sources of personnel and equipment (backfill) will cause newly-formed CEWI units to suffer the same fate, unless drastic action is taken during the early implementation of CEWI.

DA has determined current tactical MI and ASA units have serious problems which question their viability (see figure one), and is pursuing a program to create deployable, combat ready MI (CEWI) units in both the active and reserve components, consistent with total force policy. The Army has been directed by Congress to rectify the situation, or lose the units and provide for their function elsewhere in the force structure.

The major problems associated with this conversion center around the lack of mission equipment and training resources. While funds must be appropriated for the expensive equipment, there are other avenues which may be pursued to improve training, motivation, retention and recruiting to meet DA guidance.

Forces Command tasked the three CONUS armies to develop plans to implement CEWI in the reserve component. First U.S. Army oriented its proposal on a streamlined chain of command, meaningful and realistic training, incentives for retention and recruiting, and, most of all, the development of combat ready CEWI units. The remainder of this article will focus on highlights of the proposed FUSA CEWI Implementation Plan-FY82, currently under review at FORSCOM, and will briefly describe

a few measures which may be taken to help alleviate some of the problems.

Chain of Command: Reserve ASA and MI companies and detachments are buried in the Major U.S. Army Reserve Command structure. Their present chain of command to MUSARC level is multi-layered and places MI and ASA units under somewhat technically unqualified and unrelated part-time headquarters. Placing all the CEWI battalions under one predominantly full-time headquarters (such as MI Command [CEWI], or MICOM), which is subordinate to one MUSARC would streamline the RC CEWI chain of command. Current restrictions preclude the formation of a General Officer Command, which would replace the one MUSARC in this proposal, and consolidate the functions of the one MUSARC and the MICOM.

The MICOM consolidates the responsibility for all aspects of command, to include recruiting, retention, training, support facilities, equipment, evaluation, funding,

security, administration, operations, mobilization, contingency response packages, CAPSTONE (a program which identifies the wartime structure of total Army forces), etc., under one command. Streamlining the command and control of widely dispersed units headquarters, facilities and personnel would facilitate standardization of accession and retention criteria, standardize training in all facilities within the command, and would provide a focal point for all future CEWI activations. A reserve colonel would be in command, with heavy full-time (Active Guard-Reserve and Full-Time Support), RC and AC augmentation throughout the headquarters and staff, especially in the hardskill specialties, to ensure that individual training standards were raised to and remain on par with AC counterparts. A detachment within the MICOM would be provided to carry linguists, excess to current authorization, until their language is authorized in current or future organizations at the tactical or echelon above corps level. This complies with the intent of the

PROBLEMS WITH CURRENT STRUCTURE

- Unrealistic command associations, chain of command
- Absence of Equipment
- Lack of sensitive compartmented information facilities
- Unrealistic training in hardskills due to lack of qualified cadre and equipment at unit level
- Lack of established training standards
- Insufficient training time (initial and skill retention)
- Low retention of hardskills
- Inability to recruit hardskills
- Limited geographical scope of recruitment caused by monthly drill requirements

Figure One

FORSCOM RC CEWI concept in that it provides intensive management, and responds most favorably to the DA and FORSCOM concern regarding total force compatibility and streamlined chain of command.

Training: Crucial to the success of CEWI in the reserves (and the AC) is realistic training. To ensure CEWI units avoid the death traps (such as absence of equipment, unrealistic training and insufficient training time) which have plagued ASA and MI units, immediate efforts should be concentrated on building consolidated training facilities for technical proficiency training, rather than helping units dig their own graves.

Consolidated Training Facilities: The key to success of CEWI in the reserves is the establishment of CTFs. These intelligence training facilities will be primarily designed to exercise the skills of hardskill intelligence MOS personnel (hard to train and retain; CMFs 33, 96 and 98) with the frequency and intensity necessary to maintain operational proficiency for mobilization. Every attempt will be made to ensure adherence to the all-source intelligence concept of current CEWI doctrine, especially as it relates to the integration of all intelligence disciplines.

The CTFs will be able to accommodate almost any language

requirement through minor technical changes and personnel augmentation (at least one senior linguist per required language). Other hardskill training will be accomplished through other live environment training such as audio-visual modes, mission tapes, wideband and other sources requiring available technical support. They will be equipped with the latest available, high-technology equipment and training devices, to include commercial off-the-shelf equipment and NSA excess stock, all managed by a full-time cadre of about 15 personnel. First Army plans to establish four or five such facilities on a phased basis to eventually provide training for 1,577 hardskill personnel, who will comprise at least 48 percent of the U.S. Army hardskill intelligence reserve force. All except 304 of these personnel will be assigned to FUSA CEWI units. Most of the hardskill personnel will likely require routine (approximately monthly) transportation to and from the CTFs. Tasking, collection, processing, analysis and reporting of raw products will be monitored by the full-time CTF staff, and accomplished in accordance with appropriate directives and regulations.

Although CTFs will be primarily non-time-sensitive training facilities, raw intelligence product reporting

will be accomplished whenever possible and feasible to upgrade training, increase hardskill personnel incentive, aid recruiting and retention efforts, and provide limited support to the national intelligence effort.

MOS 98J training will be available at CTFs equipped with EW simulators, spectrum analyzer/visicorder positions and analysis materials, such as CTF Meade, Fort Meade, Md. A limited number of MOS 05K positions are included in the proposed CTF configuration to provide voluminous raw traffic analysis and language training.

The CTFs will have an MOS testing capability and, where feasible, secure communications will be installed to assist in technical operations. CTFs will also be capable of offering training to active duty personnel during periods of non-reserve use.

A mobile intelligence training team will be used as a mobile extension of the CTFs to train those units without sensitive compartmented information facilities and/or funds to use CTFs. One such team is already operational at Fort Meade. The equipment is mounted in an expandable van (two vans would be preferable; one for collection and the other for analysis). These teams may be deactivated when all CTFs are fully operational and capable of training all hardskill personnel. SCIFs at unit level may also be deactivated when all CTFs are fully operational and funds for their use are made readily available.

The CTF concept should be implemented immediately, regardless of the future of CEWI in the reserves. The basic concept behind the establishment of CTFs has been discussed, and in some cases partially implemented, by several organizations in the intelligence community for several years. Two CTFs are currently marginally operational (304th ASA Battalion at Austin, Texas, and the 523rd ASA Company at St. Paul, Minn.) using out-of-hide personnel, funds and equipment, and FORSCOM and NSA equipment and advisory personnel.

Attempts to develop similar facilities in the active component have not always met with success. The

CONSOLIDATED TRAINING FACILITIES

Advantages

- Centralized management
- Full-time professional cadre
- Adequate fully-equipped facilities
- High technology equipment
- Equipment consolidation
- Potential for evolution to real-time contingency missions (TROJAN)
- Meaningful training missions
- Team efforts and mission
- Continuity
- Larger pool of potential recruits
- Consolidated data base/library ADAP support feasible
- Special intelligence communications

Disadvantages

- Transportation support critical
- Billets required

Figure Two

author tried to establish a similar facility in an AC unit in the recent past. Equipment was not a problem, nor were maintenance or time. The real problem impeding success was that the combat arms commander was apprehensive about losing his unit to NSA (green door syndrome), and not being able to use his ASA (EW/SIGINT) assets during field exercises. Perhaps the key to successful use of these facilities in the AC is education and the priceless ability to schedule around maintenance, exercises, "hey you" rosters, details from higher headquarters and other commitments which comprise peacetime tactical life. No commander likes to admit to his superior commander that there are certain details he cannot perform because he must find time for his linguists to maintain their proficiency. Nevertheless, he must find a compromised, workable solution to this dilemma or he will find himself struggling with poorly trained linguists in combat.

Full-Time Personnel: Full-time individuals are needed at unit and command levels to ensure the development and retention of highly perishable intelligence skills, deployability, operational competence and reasonable continuity. They would also provide an increase in the experience, planning, preparation and coordination factors at all levels of organization from what is currently available from part-time personnel. The Active Guard-Reserve and Full-Time Support programs can help provide the vehicle for fulfilling this need. The AGR program consists of guardsmen and reservists on active duty solely to provide full-time support to selected reserve units and are paid from the reserve personnel appropriations. The FTS program is a major DA effort to enhance the mobilization readiness of reserve units. FTS includes full-time manning, technical conversion and strength improvement programs. The FTM program enhances the readiness capability of selected high priority units by providing AC and special active duty training of USAR personnel at unit level on a full-time basis. FORSCOM guidance suggested manning the CEWI units with up to 30 percent FTM personnel. This percentage included a training

cadre which FUSA has placed in the CTF TDA without using any MTOE unit personnel. FUSA recommended not more 30 personnel (15 percent) be full-time for an RC CEWI company.

Active duty personnel must bear in mind that besides the problems identified at the beginning of this article, reserve units, even at company level, are usually forced to be divided into detachments and separate elements which sometimes cause geographical isolation. In the AC, personnel are moved to the unit, whereas in the RC the unit must be formed and located near where the personnel reside. As an example, the first FUSA CEWI company, which was scheduled for activation in FY 82, would have been headquartered at Fort Lee, Va., with an aviation detachment at Fort Eustis, Va., 83 miles away, and another detachment at Charlotte, N.C., 272 miles from its headquarters element. Its next higher headquarters would have been located at Fort Meade, Md., 153 miles away, where it would also receive its hardskill training. Monetary constraints and the location of available unit personnel and supporting facilities dictate that this is

the best approach that can currently be taken. Subsequent to the submission of this plan, all unit activations have been suspended for a lack of MTOE equipment to support them. This resulted in the CONUSAs taking the new approach of going forward with the implementation of the training concepts presented in this article.

Initial Language Training: FUSA recommends professors from local universities be contracted to provide initial language training, comparable to the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center programs of instruction for basic-level language courses. Candidates would be trained for four hours per day/night, two days per week for a period of approximately 11 or more consecutive months (for the equivalent of a six-month DLI course), and would be required to attain a minimum S2-R2 level of proficiency. This would preclude the reservist from attending the lengthy and costly full-time DLIFLC courses, and also requires DLIFLC, TRADOC and DA approval. Currently, a reservist is authorized only 48 drills per year. If the reservist is to be paid for classroom attendance, special authoriza-

Non-MTOE CTF Training Equipment*

A. NSA Excess Stock

- Receivers: R390A/URR
- Recorder-Reproducers: AN/TNH-11
- Visicorders (Honeywell)
- Spectrum Analyzers: AN/UPM-58
- TEBOs: AN/GSQ-76 w/components
- Converters, Freq. Shift: AN/FRA-86
- Teleprinters: TT-470/UG
- Ancillary equipment for above

*Sample listing; not exhaustive by any means.

B. Commercial Off-the-Shelf

- Receivers (i.e. WJ-6730A, RICOM, etc.)
- ADP w/components (Min. 128K) (i.e. Apple II/III)
- Video Cassette Recorders-Reproducers (i.e. Sony Betamax)
- Video Monitors
- Morse Trainers (i.e. AEA, etc.)
- HF Antenna Systems (i.e. Hermes Loop 4R/8E-13)
- VHF Antenna Systems (i.e. Knobstick)
- EW Trainer-Simulator (i.e. AAI EW Trainer)

Figure Three

tion will have to be obtained to implement this program.

Tactical Training: All hardskill personnel will receive tactical training on appropriate tactical equipment, in a field environment under simulated tactical conditions, at least triennially. Whenever possible, this will be accomplished with the unit for which they are a mobilization (CAPSTONE) asset. Tactical equipment may be stored as unit sets at equipment concentration sites and drawn for this training. ECSs are equipment storage areas where USAR equipment not required for home station training can be located and maintained for annual training, multiple unit training or mobilization. Some tactical equipment will also be located at the CTFs to provide tactical orientation training.

Monetary and Grade Incentives: The U.S. Army Recruiting Command and DA are currently studying special enlistment, reenlistment and proficiency pay incentives for CMFs 96 and 98. FUSA's proposed MTOE for the first reserve CEWI company includes an enhanced grade structure, as an aid to recruiting, retention and career progression. Unlike his AC counterparts, a reservist usu-

ally cannot change units when he is promoted.

The author would like to remind readers that the above highlights of the FUSA plan, and the plan itself, are currently being staffed at Headquarters, FORSCOM, and represent the proposal from First Army.

Summary: CEWI in the reserves *must* live, in order to provide the much needed all-source intelligence augmentation to tactical commanders during periods of hostilities. The USAR has been informed there's a new game to play (CEWI), but that it may have to use the same pieces from the old game (MI/ASA) to play it. If CEWI is implemented in the reserves without CTF support, it will be doomed to failure by placing many of the present problems into the new units with only a cosmetic structural and name change.

Capt. Curtis R. Bartholomew is the ASA affairs officer for headquarters, First U.S. Army at Fort Meade, Md. He is the primary staff officer for the implementation of the CEWI conversion in First Army and the proposed First Army CEWI Implementation Plan-FY82. Bartholomew received a BS in Social Psychology,

summa-cum-laude, from Park College, and is a distinguished graduate of the 37A course. His previous assignments include being senior French linguist at the 7th RRFS, Thailand; training NCO and Chinese intercept team chief with the 329th ASA Company, 2nd Infantry Division, Korea; technical language assistant in the Chinese-Mandarin and French departments at the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center at Presidio of Monterey, Calif.; commander, 852nd ASA Detachment, 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, Fort Bliss, Texas; executive officer and operations platoon leader at the 407th ASA Company, 3rd ACR; and S2, 3rd Squadron, 3rd ACR.



Cryptocorner

by Walter B. Howe

This issue's Cryptocorner presents a puzzle within a puzzle. Solve the cryptogram, and you are only half done.

NWKQ PWZMLEQP WX IELSCO
VQWSQFY FQSKEM ICW IFF
MWLXS AEPO.
YPS YWKXM: OCE YWPO QFXB
ZWPO OCE YWPO VWKXMP.
PSO PKEO: YWKXM, TWQVKP WQ
VWQOZG ZWPO YWPO IELSCO.
TVZ TWQVKP: VWQOZG, PKEO WQ
YGPEZN ZWPO YWPO VWKZMP.
VNT VWQOZG: WXZG OIW WN KP
PVEFB OQKZG.
ICW ZWPO YWPO?

Once you've solved the cryptogram, try to solve the puzzle. The answer, if you need it, is enciphered below using the same alphabet as the original cryptogram inverted.

CXE DTGC OEWYXC OBG ITGC
KM GJEC. BII TCXEQ GTJCWTFG
HQEBCE B ITYW HBI SBQZTN
OWCX STQCIM'G GCBCEDEFC.

Answer on page 13

ULTRALIGHT AIRCRAFT

by Capt. Michael T. McEwen

Ultralight aircraft are simple, inexpensive airplanes that currently comprise one of the fastest growing segments of the civil aviation industry. The "Swallow" aircraft is an example of the more sophisticated end of the ultralight design spectrum. On the other end of the scale, ultralights are not much more than motorized "hang gliders."

The "high performance" ultralights could easily be adapted for Army applications and would provide a versatile and extremely cost-effective force multiplier for the Combat Electronic Warfare Intelligence (CEWI) battalion. Even a high performance ultralight aircraft is a low technology device. Because of their simplicity and low cost, ultralights are attractive from the standpoint of national weapons system policy. As low tech devices, they represent a non-escalatory system for conventional and low intensity conflict applications. Because of their relatively low cost, they can be widely deployed without undue expense. A CEWI ultralight would also have significant mission versatility.

Field testing and use of a CEWI ultralight may indicate a number of additional applications, but a basic list of possibilities can be specified.

□ Terrain analysis. This is probably the most obvious application for the aircraft; within the operating limits of range and altitude, an ultralight would be an excellent observation platform.

□ Front-line photo imagery. Equipped with Polaroid-type films or simple-to-process conventional films, an ultralight could give division and lower level commanders a completely organic imagery capability; this could provide a highly responsive supplement to current capabilities.

□ Leaflet operations. The altitude and payload capabilities of the CEWI ultralight would permit the distribu-

tion of propaganda leaflets over several square kilometers per sortie.

□ Intelligence liaison. When time and terrain considerations dictated, the ultralight could provide liaison forward to the brigades and battalions or rearward to the corps headquarters areas.

□ Secondary mission. When circumstances required, the CEWI aircraft could also perform such missions as artillery spotting, emergency re-supply of small packages such as medical supplies, and a variety of command liaison functions. The secondary missions might become the basis for another operational concept for ultralights that would be organic to the maneuver battalions and other units.

In general, ultralight aircraft have performance capabilities that are slightly different from small conventional airplanes. The following data is some typical operating figures for a high performance ultralight aircraft.

These capabilities would give a commander a significant new asset for CEWI operations. Perhaps equally important is the cost-effectiveness of the system.

Top prices for civilian ultralight aircraft are in the \$6,000 to \$7,000 range. Assuming the Army procurement doubles or triples this cost, the CEWI ultralight would still be a very inexpensive piece of hardware. Because of the simplicity of design and construction, logistical support requirements for the aircraft would be less than any other Army vehicle. Complete replacement aircraft could probably be stocked at the division support command level with minimal expense and difficulty. Rebuilding of a complete aircraft could be accomplished at the corps level.

The maintenance requirements for an ultralight aircraft are significantly lower than Army helicopters. In fact, ultralights require much less sophis-

ticated maintenance than ground vehicles such as the ubiquitous 1/4 ton truck.

The pilot pool could be the current CEWI battalion officer personnel. Because of the simplicity of ultralight flight, most Army officers could become rated to fly the CEWI aircraft.

The maintenance of an ultralight aircraft is so simple that almost any light vehicle mechanic could be trained to handle it in a two to four week course. Another possibility is to have the pilots capable of performing all first and second echelon maintenance which would require less than one hour for every four to six hours of flight. This would not place unreasonable demands on personnel available who could handle the task as an additional duty.

Because of the low cost and wide availability of current civilian ultralight aircraft, it should be easy to plan and implement a test project. In addition to using the current Army concept evaluation and equipment test system, it should be possible to quickly move to field tests conducted by deployed CEWI battalions and other units such as the military intelligence companies of the Special Forces groups in the First Special Operations Command.

Because of light weight and portability that are inherent to ultralight aircraft design, the planes are fully air droppable and air transportable. Ground transportation could be accomplished with a modification to the trailer for the 1/4 ton truck or by use of part of the load capability of any larger vehicle.

The flight characteristics of ultralights are very easy to master. Currently, civilian ultralight pilots are not required to obtain a pilot's license, although indications are that the Federal Aviation Administration may soon require minimal training and licensing. It seems clear that the training of an Army ultralight

The Swallow "B" is typical of sophisticated ultralight aircraft design and may be suitable for a variety of military missions. Ultralights use modern alloy metals and synthetic fabrics. They are usually powered by lightweight two cycle gasoline engines. (Photo courtesy Swallow AeroPlane Co.)


pilot would be much simpler than the training for Army rotary wing pilots.

It should be possible to train CEWI ultralight pilots in a four to six week course that would require 40 to 80 hours of flying time. Personnel who have military or civilian pilot certification could transition to the ultralight in a week.

Since civilian designers and manufacturers have already developed ultralights to a very high degree of sophistication and have already amassed thousands of hours of developmental and operational flights, the Army can focus on answering the operational and mission performance questions that relate to combat applications. If the temptation to "upgrade" the ultralight concept to more complex and expensive configurations can be resisted, it should be possible to quickly assess the potential of this new system and, if it proves worthwhile, to rapidly integrate it into the Army inventory. The simplicity and low cost of ultralight aircraft give them an interesting and potentially high value role in CEWI battalions operations.

Capt. Michael T. McEwen has completed the Infantry Officer basic and advanced courses, the Medical Service Corps Officer advanced course, and the Military Intelligence branch qualification course (advanced). He has received a bachelor's degree in Philosophy and Arts and Sciences, and a master's degree in Political Science. He was commissioned in the National Guard upon completion of Officer Candidate School. McEwen served in several National Guard assignments until he was recalled to the active Army. He is currently an instructor in the Department of Psychological Operations, School of International Studies, U.S. Army Institute for Military Assistance at Fort Bragg, N. C..

January-March 1983



Typical Ultralight Aircraft Performance Data

Top speed	60 - 70 mph
Cruise speed	45 - 60 mph
Landing speed	28 - 35 mph
Take-off over 50 ft. obstacle	300 - 400 ft.
Take-off ground roll	75 - 100 ft.
Landing over 50 ft. obstacle	350 - 400 ft.
Landing ground roll	125 - 150 ft.
Initial rate of climb (sea level)	400 - 800 ft. per min.
Maximum altitude	5000 - 10,000 ft.
Pilot and payload (fully fueled)	200 - 300 lb.
Endurance	0.5 - 2.0 hr.

INTELLIGENCE IS FOR THE COMMANDER

IEW '82 SPR

INTELLIGENCE ELECTRONIC WARFARE SYSTEM PROGRAM REVIEW

The Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Systems Program Review '82 involved the time, talents and efforts of many people and organizations throughout the Army, other services and the national intelligence community. The culmination of these efforts is embodied in the IEWSPR '82 Action Plan.

The Action Plan contains the recommendations made by the three general officer panels and some that were generated during in-process reviews. With each recommendation, there are actions to be taken listed with the agency or office responsible.

All recommendations contained in the Action Plan were presented to the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army on October 7 1982, during the SPR. After incorporating the VCSA's guidance into the Action Plan, it was forwarded on October 21 to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations for final Army staff review and VCSA approval. The Action Plan will become directive in nature to become implemented by the appropriate agencies. To insure the Action Plan continues to move forward toward implementation, the Army Electronic Warfare and Intelligence Committee will monitor the progress of the Action Plan and the VCSA has requested periodic updates.

The Action Plan represents intelligence and electronic warfare elements worldwide. It represents you because most of the substantive operational issues addressed in the IEWSPR originated in the field. With that in mind we have forwarded a copy of the Action Plan to every division, corps, echelon above corps and senior MI command. This was done to let you know what is being done to improve IEW capabilities. We at USAICS will participate fully in the process reviews held by the AEWIC and presented to the VCSA, and we will keep you informed.

Thank you for your participation and continued interest in the IEWSPR. The review is over but the work has just begun.

Brig. Gen. Sidney T. Weinstein

Panel I: What do we have now (1983-1985)?



by Col. Michael L. O'Kane

Mission: Assess current IEW capabilities to fight the AirLand Battle, identify shortfalls, and recommend near-term (1983-1985) fixes.

Participants:

Brig. Gen. (P) James E. Drummond, assistant deputy chief of staff, Combat Developments, Headquarters, TRADOC—panel moderator
Maj. Gen. George E. Marine, commander, Army Readiness and Mobilization Region II
Maj. Gen. Thomas J. Flynn, deputy chief, Cryptologic Security Service, Assistant Deputy Director Operations, National Security Agency
Maj. Gen. Crosbie E. Saint, deputy commandant, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Brig. Gen. (P) Collin L. Powell, deputy commanding general, Combined Arms Center
Brig. Gen. Leonard J. Riley, commanding general, 7th Signal Command
Col. Michael L. O'Kane, commander, School Brigade, USAICS—panel coordinator

To accomplish its mission, Panel I surveyed field commanders to determine their perceptions of IEW today. Responses were aggregated into seven major areas of concern and subjected to detailed analysis. The reader is asked to forebear the

obvious limitations imposed by space and security considerations.

Intelligence Collection: Tactical commanders require sufficient collections assets to see deep on the AirLand battlefield. Shortages of TOE equipment and old equipment of questionable reliability impact adversely on training. A thorough scrub of IEW systems authorized, on hand, and projected by 1985 was undertaken. Proposed solutions included funding Intelligence, Surveillance and Target Acquisition equipments in the current Army program, as well as funding REM-BASS (Remotely Monitored Battlefield Sensor System).

Deep Reconnaissance: Corps commanders require a tactical ground reconnaissance capability to satisfy the intelligence requirements to see deep. There was great support among panel members for the field requests for a HUMINT capability to deal with the long-range surveillance, observation and reporting requirement. Recommendations included assigning deep reconnaissance missions to the Army National Guard, activating three more National Guard companies (Ranger Recon) and affiliating each with a corps, upgrading light weight communications equipment, and developing an operational and organizational concept for deep reconnaissance units.

Information Processing: The panel concluded that today's information processing system could be improved by the immediate fielding of available micro-processors. The many tactical applications for micro-processors include target analysis, mapping techniques, DF triangulation, maintenance and manipulation of data bases, tactical simulation, language training with video (two language tracks), and automation of the air tasking order. It is going to be important to widely disseminate field initiatives and lessons learned and to integrate micro-processors into existing training courses.

Jamming: The panel documented a requirement to clarify jamming doctrine and recommended early publication of How-to-Fight manuals. The panel also recommended buying off-the-shelf systems to upgrade collection assets and consider buying jammers off the shelf.

Dissemination: Tactical commanders must be able to receive and disseminate intelligence data with sufficient timeliness to fight the AirLand Battle. The panel was confident that procurement and fielding schedules for selected priority items of equipment are on track. Additionally, accelerating procurement of ground sensor terminals and associated personnel were urged. Finally, the panel believed that accelerated development and procurement of commanders' tactical terminals for selected units were necessary.

CEWI Force Structure: The Army needs an adequate Combat Electronic Warfare and Intelligence force structure. The panel concurred that the Army decision to field CEWI was correct, notwithstanding that it was known at the outset that the equipment, training, personnel, doctrine and logistics would have to catch up. Four years after that decision, several IEW units still do not have the necessary people or equipment. While the panel clearly recognized the problems and heard the concern of commanders, it concluded that intensive management is producing results and improvement will continue.

To partially offset Reserve Component problems, limited, selected off-the-shelf equipment is planned by FORSCOM to enhance training. The panel agreed with the FORSCOM position that activation of Reserve Component CEWI units should be postponed until mission and mission support equipments can be made available.

SCI Security Clearance Process: The Army must have timely clearance determination for personnel requiring SCI access. The current process is too slow and has adverse impact on morale and unit readiness. The panel found that the time required for clearance creates an untenable situation that must be corrected. The panel suggested that TRADOC carefully scrub TOE to validate requirements for SCI access and that the ACSI should seek ways to expedite the decision-making process.

The panel's 24 specific recommendations for improvements in the near-term were incorporated into the IEWSR Action Plan.

Panel II: What do we do next (1986-1990)?



by Col. Glenn F. Hargis

Mission: Identify and recommend solutions to projected deficiencies resulting from the IEW Mission Area Analysis (1986-1990).

Participants:

Brig. Gen. Sidney T. Weinstein, commanding general, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School—panel moderator

Maj. Gen. Theodore G. Jenes, Jr., commanding general, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized)

Maj. Gen. Dale A. Vesser, deputy commanding general, III Corps

Brig. Gen. Claude T. Ivey, deputy chief of staff for Doctrine, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command

Brig. Gen. Ellis D. Parker, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Headquarters, Department of the Army

Col. Glenn F. Hargis, director, Directorate of Combat Developments, USAICS—panel coordinator

Panel II used the IEW Mission Area Analysis Level II report as the baseline source document. The MAA examined the Army 86 force structure against a 1990 threat in a European scenario. The IEW requirements were compared with capabilities, and shortfalls were determined. The shortfalls were prioritized and formed the foundation for Panel II's issues and recommendations.

Panel II's presentation was structured around the IEW architecture. It is driven by both a postulated 1990 threat and technology. The architecture is designed to satisfy the commander's needs; specifically, his information needs for situation and target development, and his operational needs for electronic countermeasures (jamming and collection) and OPSEC support. The key to our ability to collect, analyze and disseminate intelligence is the All-Source Analysis System at division, corps and echelon above corps. Automated intelligence processing is necessary to ensure that resources are properly managed, and their results are correlated within and among echelons and disciplines to focus on critical nodes and provide timely, accurate intelligence. The architecture is designed to assure a multi-disciplined, reliable approach to providing IEW support to the AirLand Battle.

The tactical IEW mission is to provide the commander with accurate, timely information as to enemy locations and intentions, locate high-payoff targets with sufficient accuracy for the commander to effectively employ his forces and weapons systems, and assist the commander with the protection of the force through operations security. The IEW system is organized to satisfy four major IEW tasks in support of the commander.

The IEWMAA was directed to evaluate the tactical echelons of corps and divisions; but, it also looked at echelons above corps and determined the required support to the corps and the divisions' and the EAC's ability to meet that requirement. The MAA is designed "to identify the tasks to be performed by all elements within the mission area; determine the ability of present and projected elements of the mission area to perform those tasks; identify deficiencies in doctrine, training, force structure and materiel; recommend preferred, feasible solutions to eliminate the deficiencies; and identify opportunities for capitalizing on technological breakthroughs and recommend actions to be taken when such opportunities are found." The purpose of MAA is to identify significant IEW requirements to 1990; determine the capa-

bility to satisfy those requirements; identify IEW deficiencies; and recommend solutions for major deficiencies.

Panel II pointed out inadequacies in planned IEW capabilities to support the 1990 AirLand Battle. Recommendations developed by Panel II did not come exclusively from the MAA, but also from the field, HQDA, TRADOC, INSCOM, USACAC and USAICS. Panel II discussed how adoption of their recommended solutions will provide satisfactory, sustainable IEW support to the tactical commander in 1990. Panel recommendations included the use of multi-sensor, unmanned aerial vehicles capable of ranging the corps and division areas of influence; development of viable OPSEC and deception support programs; development of sensors to locate and track moving targets; expanded jamming capabilities; improved collection management doctrine; and better trained all-source analysts.

Panel II made recommendations for Army systems improvements which reflect the capabilities required by the Army to fulfill our tactical commanders' information and operational needs, in addition to that support which can logically be expected from other services and national systems. Panel II's recommendations included not only new and improved hardware systems, but also ways to overcome deficiencies in training, organization, and doctrine. Detailed costs of these recommendations have not yet been worked out. USAICS will work with DA staff, TRADOC and DARCOM to develop an IEW systems acquisition plan based on the MAA. Panel II recommendations will get the Army the most cost and operationally effective mix of RDTE and procurement programs to provide for both near-term and long-term capabilities.



Panel III: How do we rapidly get what we need?



by Col. Floyd L. Runyon

Mission: Determine what can be done to expedite the acquisition and fielding of intelligence and electronic warfare systems.

Participants:

Maj. Gen. Emmett Paige, Jr., commander, U.S. Army Electronics Research and Development Command—panel moderator

Brig. Gen. Phillip H. Mason, director, Combat Support Systems, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Research, Development and Acquisition

Brig. Gen. Robert D. Morgan, deputy commander, U.S. Army

Communications-Electronics Command
Brig. Gen. (P) Julius Parker, Jr., deputy chief of staff for Intelligence, U.S. Army Europe and VII Army

Brig. Gen. James A. Teal, Jr., deputy chief of staff for Intelligence, U.S. Army Forces Command

Dr. Robert B. Oswald, technical director, U.S. Army Electronics Research and Development Command

Mr. Herbert S. Hovey, director, U.S. Army Signals Warfare Laboratory

Dr. Carl T. Verhey, scientific advisor, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School

Mr. Roland E. Berg, assistant director for Maintenance Management, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics

Col. Floyd L. Runyon, TRADOC systems manager, All-Source Analysis System—panel coordinator

It has historically taken the Army too long to field new materiel systems, and this has been particularly true in the area of Intelligence and Electronic Warfare. When both combat developments and materiel developments are considered, it takes up to 15 years from the recognition of need to initial operational capability in the field. Clearly, this is too long to respond in a technology driven environment such as IEW. We risk the fielding of new systems which may be technologically obsolete against the threat they were designed to exploit or counter.

The panel members met and conferred numerous times during the spring and summer of 1982. They reviewed the entire Army acquisition process to include combat developments, materiel developments, test and evaluation procedures, RDTE and procurement programming and budgeting, and management procedures. They then isolated bottlenecks in the process, developed issues and specific problems, identified potential solutions and recommended tasks for incorporation into the IEWSPR-82 Action Plan. In all, Panel III developed seven major issues and 56 recommendations with 87 actions and 100 specific tasks for incorporation into the Action Plan to improve and shorten the IEW systems acquisition process. All panel issues and recommendations were presented to Gen. Glenn K. Otis, TRADOC commander, and to Gen. Donald R. Keith, DARCOM commander, prior to the actual meeting of the IEWSPR.

Highlights of the seven major issues and solutions addressed by the panel were as follows:

First: Improvements are needed in the long range planning for and justification of IEW systems acquisition, to include continuity of the justification and budget planning. The Mission Area Analyses being developed by TRADOC centers are a step in the right direction, but more is needed, to include a 20-year systems acquisition plan for IEW. We need to develop a means to quantify the impact of IEW systems on battle outcomes based upon improved simulation and use this tool for better and more consistent articulation of requirements.

Second: The combat developments process needs to be shortened. It cur-

rently takes up to two years to write, staff and get a requirements document approved by DA. As a result, it often takes from four to five years for a user perceived systems requirement to be processed into an initial contract award. Recommended improvements included a reduction of reiterative worldwide staffing of draft requirements documents, the convening of Joint Working Groups with MACOM participation to draft initial requirements, and appending of DA approved milestone decisions from in-process reviews to Systems Acquisition Review Council to the original requirement, rather than rewriting and restaffing the requirements documentation. The on-going TRADOC initiative to hold down the size and scope of requirement documents was recognized as a positive initiative. Holding requirements firm and restricting requirement changes which result in engineering change proposals was also recognized as imperative to shorten the acquisition process.

Third: There is a need to improve initial systems cost estimating. This begins with the costs provided for inclusion in initial requirements documents and permeates the entire acquisition and programming process. Our apparent inability to accurately predict systems acquisition costs leads to under budgeting, the appearance of cost overruns throughout the acquisition of new systems, and program stretch-outs. Recommended fixes include better education of DARCOM engineers in cost analysis procedures, holding requirements firm (as previously addressed), and establishing cost models and historical cost data bases for like-technology reference systems for preparation of initial cost estimates. Also, steps were recommended to better manage technology risk through improved costing and management interface and exchange of information between DARCOM and industry. A number of other specific recommendations were made addressing the area of cost control management for systems under contract. Included were recommendations for full funding of systems specific RDTE programs, a reinstatement of the Army-wide prioritization process, and support for on-going initiatives in multi-year funding of acquisi-

tion programs. Also recommended was the application of the DARCOM Project Management Control System discipline of management and documentation to all IEW systems acquisitions, as a management tool for the project or program manager.

Fourth: We must make better use of adaptable industrial technology to give us near-term response to the threat and provide an improved reaction capability to threat changes. Solutions include increased use and enforcement of EW quick reaction capability and non-developmental item acquisition procedures, and coordination suspenses. Also, the increased use of military adaptation of commercial items procedures and the intentional design of systems for modular upgrade in support of a pre-planned product improvement design philosophy will help in the rapid fielding of "core" capability systems which can be improved after fielding.

Fifth: The panel supported on-going initiatives for concurrency of RDTE and procurement actions, and made specific recommendations for application of these procedures to IEW systems acquisition to shorten or eliminate the current delays between successful second development testing/operational testing and initial production. This step could reduce initial fielding time by up to two years because it can take up to that long after a production decision for delivery of military and commercial common components before actual production systems assembly can begin.

Sixth: Recommendations were made to shorten and improve the entire testing and evaluation process for IEW systems. This can be accomplished by early combat and materiel developer coordination in the development of test issues, criteria and test plans, and by intentional elimination of test elements which do not contribute directly to fielding or procurement decisions. Reciprocal observation and comment by the combat and materiel developers might also eliminate the need for current, time consuming, independent evaluations as well.

Seventh: The Achilles Heel of IEW is its dependence upon quality, high volume, rapid communications between sensors and processing

centers, and between those centers and support command elements. The problem is that the Army's communications acquisitions are managed separately from IEW (as well as other Army entities) which must depend on time. The result has been that communications connectivity has not always been in place for newly fielded IEW systems, and the debate continues relative to the quantity and capacity of Army tactical communications to support the IEW and other requirements of the 1980s and beyond. The panel recommended that actions be continued to ensure that IEW communications requirements are provided to the appropriate commodity managers, that data interchange sheets be completed early in the IEW systems life-cycle process, and that the PM and TSMs conduct early coordination with user units to ensure that required communications are in

place in time. A fallout of this process is an implicit requirement to design IEW systems and organizations to be compatible with the communications architecture anticipated to be in place at the time of fielding.

These are only examples of the many recommendations under each of Panel III's issues to improve and shorten the IEW systems acquisition process. Some of the solutions are not unique and have been identified by the Army Systems Acquisition Steering Group. Where this has occurred, the panel recommendations were offered as reinforcement. Many of the recommended solutions have potentially broader applications than just to IEW systems acquisition.


The Panel III IEWSPR recommendations are in many cases applicable to all functional areas of the Army, but are imperative for IEW, because

of the rapidly changing and technology-driven threat environment. The panel estimated that up to six years could be carved off the average acquisition time for IEW systems, if all recommendations and actions are implemented. The EW quick response capability process could be reduced to a three-year average time from approval of requirement to OIC. In the process, we would have a better justified, better managed, and more accurate costed and programmed IEW systems acquisition process. Gen. John A. Wickham, Jr., vice chief of staff of the Army, supported the philosophy of Panel III's recommendations in the IEWSPR Action Plan, and instructed that all information be turned over to the Army Systems Acquisition Steering Group for consideration and implementation, as appropriate.



YEH-60A QUICK FIX IIA takes first flight


The Army's newest electronic reconnaissance aircraft, the YEH-60A QUICK FIX IIA, took its initial flight at Moffett Naval Air Station, Calif. in October 1982. Primarily a communications intercept, location and jamming system, it is the one of the latest Army division EW support systems. ESL Inc., the prime contractor for the YEH-60A, designed and built the reconnaissance system and installed it in a modified Sikorsky Black Hawk, the tactical utility helicopter slated to replace the Bell UH-1 "Huey." (Photo courtesy of ESL Inc.)



OPFOR 83 Training Scheduler Second Installment

Intelligence training is a major challenge to S2 and G2 personnel - a challenge which is being met by astute intelligence personnel and training managers at all levels of command. These personnel must insure that intelligence in command post and field training exercises continues to be accurately portrayed. The result will be competitive training which provides combat realism.

This training scheduler is an effort to provide information of this type to unit intelligence officers and training managers. Your comments on its usefulness and suggestions for its continuation are invited. Please forward your comments to Commander, US Army Intelligence Center and School, Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613. Or if more convenient, call the Training Hotline Code-a-Phone: AUTOVON 879-3609.



Sidney T. Weinstein
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding

ИЮЛЬ

In Soviet tactical doctrine, the defensive is a temporary expedient. When circumstances force a Soviet army commander to assume the defensive, he sets up successive defensive belts in depth. Each defense belt consists of a series of mutually supported, self-sufficient areas manned by motorized rifle troops with artillery and tank support. The commander holds a mobile reserve for each defense belt. Normally there are four levels: (1) a security zone, (2) a main defense belt, (3) a second defense belt and (4) the third defense belt.

AGS-17 Automatic Grenade Launcher fires a 30mm high-explosive fragmentation grenade with a bursting radius of about 10 meters. The weapon resembles a heavy machine gun. The "Grenade Machine Gun" is mounted on a carriage and is equipped with an optical sight. It is quite distinctive because of its short barrel.

AGS-17 CHARACTERISTICS:

Caliber:	30 mm
Length:	1000 cm
Weight, (empty on tripod)	30 kg
Magazine Capability	29 rds
Fire Type	Semi or Selective
Ammunition	HE, AP incendiary with an est wgt of 300 - 400 grams
Range: Max Practical	700 - 800 m

3	4	5	6	7	8	9	2
International Cooperative Day						Peter III overthrown by Catherine II in 1762	
10	11	12	13	14	15	16	
Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Established in 1916						Kushchikov was fired from his post in 1964	
17	18	19	20	21	22	23	
			International CHESS DAY				
24/31	25	26	27	28	29	30	
	SOVIET NAVY DAY						


• **MISTING ENGAGEMENT:** OCCURS WHEN THE BLUE FORCE AND THE OFFER ARE BOTH ADVANCING TO CONTACT FROM THE MARCH. • THE GUN DISH FIRE CONTROL RADAR ON ZBU-83-4 IS DESIGNED TO ACQUIRE LOW LEVEL AIRCRAFT. • MAIN DEFENSIVE BELT PLATOON POSITIONS WILL BE HELD BY THE COMPANY COMMANDER. • THE BMD EQUIPPED REGIMENT OF THE AIRBORNE DIVISION HAS

107 RAD'S. • THE SOVIET ASSIGN CODE WORDS TO PROMINENT TERRAIN FEATURES WITHIN EACH COMPANY'S BOUNDARIES. • CURRENTLY, NORTH KOREA AND THE SOVIET ARE THE ONLY COUNTRIES IDENTIFIED BY AR 366-2 AS POTENTIAL ADVERSARIES. • THE GUNNER ON A SOVIET TANK IS SECOND IN COMMAND AND HIS MAIN JOB IS FIRING, SERVICING, AND REPAIRING THE TANK GUN.

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
T-80 / ARMORED TROOPS



ABFYCT
AUGUST

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BM-27/ARTILLERY TROOPS



Artist's
Impression



СЕНТЯБРЬ
SEPTEMBER

To achieve desired fire support in a breakthrough, the Soviets form regimental, divisional, and army artillery groupings (respectively RAG, DAG, and AAG). An artillery grouping is temporary in nature and consists of two or more artillery battalions. When a RAG is formed, it does not include the MRR's organic artillery battalion.

BM-27 is a 16 round launcher mounted onto an 8X8 ZIL-135 truck chassis. The launch tubes are arranged in three banks. The upper bank having four tubes and the bottom two banks having six tubes each.

BM-27 CHARACTERISTICS:

Launcher	
Max Elevation	*55%
Max Rate of Fire	*1 per sec
Round	
Caliber	*200 mm
Weight	*300 kg
Length	*4.8 m
Stabilization, Type	Fin & Spin
Max Range	35000 to 40000 m

*Note: all are approximate


1	2	3
8	9	10
15	16	17
22	23	24
29	30	31

* THE NORTH KOREAN ARMY CAN BE EXPECTED TO EMPLOY CHEMICAL AGENTS BASED ON SOVIET
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OPFOR
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JUNIOR COMMANDERS TO USE INITIATIVE. * SOVIET DOCTRINE SPECIFIES THAT MINIFIELDS BE
EMPLOYED TO CANALIZE APPROACHING ENEMY FORCES INTO PREPLANNED KILL ZONES. * HASTY
DEFENSE: BEGUN WITH LITTLE OR NO PREPARATION, THE HD IS EMPLOYED TO GAIN TIME BET-
WEEN OFFENSIVE MANEUVERS. * THE KEY TO SUCCESSFUL PURSUIT OPERATIONS IS THE TIMING.

NOTES:



The main function of OPFOR combat engineers is to support the mobility of the maneuver arms by accelerating their movement across natural and man-made obstacles when in the offense, and hindering enemy force movement while in the defense. To accomplish these missions, OPFOR engineer units are located at all command levels from Front through maneuver regiment.

The TMM Truck-mounted multiple-span bridge consists of four 10.5 meter spans, each of which is carried and launched from the rear of a modified KrAZ-214 or a KrAZ-255B (6x6) truck.

The complete four-span TMM bridge can span a gap of up to 40 meters in 45-60 minutes during daylight hours or 60-80 minutes during limited visibility.

To diminish the possibility of detection, the TMM can also be positioned below the water's surface, which requires 50 percent more time to complete.

TMM CHARACTERISTICS:

Vehicle with Bridge			Bridge		
Weight	19.5 t	Weight	7. t		
Length	9.3 m	Length	10.5 m		
Width; (folded)	3.2 m	Width; (unfolded)			
Height	3.15 m	Width	3.8 m		
Range	530 km	Trestle Leg Length			
Fuel Capacity	450 ltrs		3.2 m		
Fording	1 m	Capacity	60. t		
		Crew	1 + 2		

MANEUVER FORCE ATTACKING A DEFENDING ENEMY IS DONE IN THREE PHASES: PREPARATORY FIRES, FIRES IN SUPPORT OF THE ATTACK, FIRES IN ENEMY REAR AREAS. • CONSCRIPTS ARE INDUCTED INTO THE SOVIET ARMY AT SIX MONTH INTERVALS AND SERVE FOR AT LEAST TWO YEARS. THEREFORE, 20% OF A COMBAT UNIT CHANGES EVERY SIX MONTHS. • OFFER (OPPOSING FORCES).


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• THE PURSUIT FORCE MUST BE LAUNCHED EARLY ENOUGH, AND RAPIDLY ENOUGH, TO INSURE THAT THE WITHDRAWING BLUE FORCE DOES NOT HAVE TIME TO ESTABLISH OR REESTABLISH EFFECTIVE DEFENSES. • THE SOVIET'S DIVIDE SMOKE INTO THREE CATEGORIES: TOXIC SMOKE, SIGNALLING SMOKE, • SCREENING BLINDING SMOKE. • SOVIET ARTILLERY SUPPORT FOR THE

NOTES:

**ОКТАБРЬ
ОКТОВЕР**

2	3	4	5	6	7	8	1
		FIRST SPACE SATELLITE IN 1957 NAMED "SPUTNIK"		KONSTANTIN CHERNENKO WAS APPOINTED OF THE SECRETARY OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY 13 IN 1977			
9	10	11	12		14	15	
	ALL UNION AGRICULTURAL WORKERS DAY					Cuban Missile Crisis began in 1962.	
16	17	18	19	20	21	22	
	FOOD INDUSTRY WORKERS DAY		GREAT RETREAT OF KREMLIN'S GRAND ARMY IN 1812.				
23/30	24/31	25	26	27	28	29	
						Cuban Missile Crisis ended in 1962.	KOMSONOL FOUNDING DAY



НОВАЯ
НОВЕМБЕР

6	7	1	2	3	4	5
	THE GREAT OCCIDENTAL SOCIALIST REVOLUTION (GOSR)	8	9	10	11	12
	14	15	16	17	18	19
13	Hungarian revolt ends in 1856.	22	23	24	25	26
20	21	22	23	24	25	26
27	28	29	30			

A comprehensive CBR training program, impressive CBR protective equipment, and chemical defense troops are largely responsible for Soviet prominence in the field of CBR defense. CBR training actually begins long before conscription into military service. In schools and in extracurricular activities Soviet youths receive CBR protective training including familiarization with gas masks and CBR detection instruments. In the military, CBR training is increased and incorporated into tactical training.

The TMS-65 is an effective NBC defense weapon, which has a modified aircraft turbojet mounted on a URAL-375, using heat and water or a decontamination fluid to decontaminate an armor vehicle in one to three minutes. It may also be used as a smoke generator. A major limitation is that it must be deployed on hard surface ground due to its gross weight. This makes it difficult to camouflage. The TMS-65 can treat up to 40 tanks an hour, depending on type and amount of contamination. Note: the TMS-65 decontamination vehicles are employed in pairs at approximately 50 meter intervals, opposite of one another.


• IF THE SOVIET COMMANDER BELIEVES THE ENEMY FORCE IS PREPARED FOR A MEETING ENGAGEMENT, THE COMMANDER WILL RAPIDLY DEPLOY ASSIGNED ARTILLERY FOR THE IMMEDIATE INDIRECT FIRE SUPPORT. • SOVIET MILITARY MAPS ARE TIGHTLY CONTROLLED. MAPS WITH A MILITARY GRID AND GEOGRAPHIC CORNER VALUES ARE CLASSIFIED SECRET. • THE OPFOR PRO-

OPFOR
83

GRAM IS INTENDED TO SATISFY THE NEED FOR A REALISTIC EXERCISE ANTAGONIST WHICH CHALLENGES THE FRIENDLY OR BLUE FORCE. • ORGANIC AIR DEFENSE FOR THE OPFOR MOTORIZED RIFLE CO CONSISTS OF ONE 3-MAN SA-7 GRAIL SECTION. FOR OPFOR PURPOSES, ONE SA-7 GUNNER WILL BE ASSIGNED TO EACH MOTORIZED RIFLE PLATOON COLLOCATED WITH THE PLT LEADER.

NOTES:

RPG-7V/MOTORIZED RIFLE TROOPS



ДЕКАБРЬ
DECEMBER

4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31
	SOVIET CONSTRUCTION DAY														Leonid I. Brezhnev's Birthday. 1906									Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979.		UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC FOUNDING DAY	

• OPFOR PLANNERS MUST INSURE THAT TACTICAL MARCHES ARE CONFIGURED IN SUCH A FASHION AS TO FACILITATE RAPID COMBAT ACTION. • THE MARCH AS AN EXPLOITATION FORCE FOLLOWING SUCCESSFUL ATTACKS BY LEADING REGIMENTS. • THE SOVIET COMMANDER HAS A MOBILE RESERVE

NOTES:

Formal ground forces officer training takes place in a complex and extensive system of approximately 70 military schools and 5 academies, with programs ranging from 3 to 5 years in length.

Each Ground Forces branch operates its own officer schools and at least one academy. Combined arms, tank, and artillery schools are the most numerous.

The most important step in an officer's military education is attending one of the branch or component academies, of which the best known is the Frunze Academy.

The latter prepares motorized rifle officers for command and staff positions from battalion to division level. The training of senior officers for command assignments at division or higher level and of staff officers for combined arms armies and higher headquarters takes place at the Military Academy of the General Staff.

The RPG-7V is a standard anti-armor Soviet infantry weapon and fires a "HEAT or HE" warhead which has improved fusing. The "HEAT" round can penetrate up to 320mm of armor.

The sight can be supplemented by the NSP-2 (IR) night sight.

RPG-7V CHARACTERISTICS:

Weight Firing:	7 kg
Length, w/o projectile:	9.9 mm
Caliber of tube:	40 mm
Caliber of projectile:	85 mm
Mass of Projectile:	2.25 kg
Muzzle velocity:	300 m/sec
Effective Range: (moving)	300 m
(stationary)	500 m

FOR EACH DEFENSE BELT. A SECURITY ZONE. MAIN DEFENSE BELT. SECOND DEFENSE BELT. THIRD DEFENSE BELT. YOUR COMMENTS TO THE CDR, US ARMY INTEL CENTER & SCHOOLS, FORT HUACHUCA, ARIZONA 85613 OR CALL OUR TRAINING HOTLINE CODE. A. PHONE: AVN 879-3609.

Training Scheduler

Designed by the:

Training & Audiovisual Support Center

Visual Aids Branch

Fort Huachuca, Arizona

Electronic Warfare at National Training Center

by Capt. Christopher Hamilton

On 16 October 1980, the National Training Center was activated and a new opportunity for the employment of Electronic Warfare was born. The requirement for the realistic portrayal of EW was identified early in the planning stages of the NTC and substantial work was done by the staffs of both FORSCOM and TRADOC. The TDA for the NTC was designed to include equipment and personnel which support the FORS-

shipped by rail to the Marine Corps Logistics Base, Yermo, Calif., and then convoyed 28 miles to Fort Irwin, Calif., the home of the NTC. Troops are flown in and deployed directly to the field, where they remain for the entire exercise. Units are advised to plan for the hot and cold extremes of the inhospitable Mojave Desert (unit should obtain a copy of TB 43-0239 "Maintenance in the Desert").

During the rotation there are two types of training events. Both battalion task forces and the brigade headquarters participate in force-on-force training. The brigade must

manage notional forces which would normally be assigned to them. The battalion task forces are removed one at a time and rotated to a special live-fire course. Soldiers use live ammunition to engage electronically controlled targets which depict a motorized rifle regiment. The live-fire includes integration with live air attacks and artillery fire.

During the force-on-force engagements the Blue Forces must face the awesome OPFOR Motorized Rifle Regiment. The MRR consists of two American units, the 6th Battalion (Mechanized), 31st Infantry and the 1st Battalion 73rd Armor. They are outfitted with M551 Sheridans that have fiber-glass visual modifications which resemble Soviet equipment. The vehicles used by both sides are equipped with the Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System and special instrumentation, which provides near-combat effects and the results of battle engagements. The MRR has the equivalent of three reinforced battalions of combat vehicles, appropriate

A Motorized Rifle Battalion in the Assembly Area.



COM Task Forces and the OPFOR Motorized Rifle Regiment. While training at the NTC rotational units are challenged by replication of Radio-Electronic Combat by the OPFOR EW/REC detachment the unit will also have the opportunity to draw EW equipment on-site to support their own EW and intelligence collection efforts.

Rotations at the NTC usually last about three weeks—two weeks of training and one week for drawing and turning in equipment. Some of the equipment used by support troops is prepositioned and is drawn upon arrival. All other equipment is



613-A VISMOD of a ZSU-23-4

artillery support, air defense, a reconnaissance company, plus smoke and engineer support. INSCOM has provided C Company, 11th MI Battalion, to the NTC to include actual foreign equipment for visual recognition. When the fire power of the MRR is coupled with air support and EW the NTC offers the most complete and effective training environment short of actual combat.

Force-on-force engagements are designed and controlled by the Operations Group, a special element

Watkins-Johnson 8975-Direction finder with EW/REC team



of TRADOC specifically designed to develop the means of challenging and training a rotational unit's commander and staff. Operations Group controls the exercise by acting as the division headquarters and issues operations orders that outline the situation. A myriad of information is provided about adjacent unit activities, the effectiveness of the unit's notional task forces, and simulated intelligence traffic. The information which is passed to the brigade is designed to realistically exercise organic and attached intelligence assets. Units are not given a pass/fail grade, instead they are given real-time constructive criticism

founded on U.S. doctrine. Units which study the comments and apply the doctrine in a forthright manner have made tremendous improvements in their ability to fight outnumbered and win.

The OPFOR EW/REC detachment is the element responsible for providing intercept, jamming, direction finding, and ground surveillance radar support to the MRR. The primary purpose of the detachment is to provide an active environment during the force-on-force portion of training. Unlike conventional EW units, the detachment uses O5G personnel for intercept and analysis of

reconnaissance company to gather intelligence for the MRR commander.

The unit uses a variety of standard issue and off-the-shelf electronics equipment. For intercept and direction finding, the unit uses the AN/TRQ-32, with Bearcat 220 scanners, and the AN/GRR-8, known as the Watkins-Johnson 8975 direction finder. The unit has three AN/PPS-5Bs for GSR support. To jam, the unit has two AN/VLQ-4s (Piranha), a single channel applique jammer which uses the AN/VRC-46 as an exciter and a bumper mounted Log Periodic Antenna.

The detachment has a special working agreement with the Army Development and Acquisition of Threat Simulators Unit, Fort Bliss, Texas, which provides two types of jamming simulators to the NTC, the XM330 and the XM83.

The EW/REC detachment is not given access to the Blue Force CEOI, nor is the reverse true, however both sides are provided with a taboo/protected frequency list by the post spectrum management office. Prior to deployment to the NTC units should contact the SMO (470-3280/81) to determine those frequencies which will be clear for high power interference. Units must get permission prior to conducting jamming missions from the Plans and Operations section of Operations Group. During missions the post stop-buzzer frequency must be monitored to insure positive on/off control for safety.

Rotational units also receive electronic equipment. Currently the Blue task force receives two AN/TRQ-32s and three AN/PPS-5Bs. Future plans call for the prepositioning of three AN/VLQ-4s. The post stocks ASL/PLL to support these systems and has the majority of the TMDE needed to maintain them. Units must bring their own electronics repairman, and should contact the Rotational Control Cell(470-4648) to determine the availability of systems/support.

The NTC offers MI units with EW capabilities a rare opportunity. Units must coordinate with the brigade staff, maneuver in a hostile environment, and collect real-time intelligence which can be integrated with fire and maneuver plans. Those

Blue Force communications. These personnel serve two ways; first, their analysis helps to determine which frequencies are priority targets for jamming or direction finding missions, and second, the unit informs personnel in Operations Group about communications security violations that rotational units have committed so they can be corrected. Once targets have been identified, trained O5B personnel will conduct jamming or direction finding missions against critical command communications links. Although GSR teams are not considered EW assets, the detachment has teams which are deployed with the OPFOR

units with organic intelligence/EW assets have chosen to deploy a brigade slice to the NTC. Those units which lack intelligence/EW assets have coordinated with either the reserves or other active duty units that desired to train in a live environment. The results have been beneficial for the units desiring training and the rotational units which received the needed intelligence support.

The NTC motto is "Lead, Train, Win." The challenge to excel has been extended to the MI community and every unit should plan on taking advantage of this opportunity. Those units which seize this opportunity to train and learn from their mistakes will be prepared to win in battle.



Capt. Christopher Hamilton graduated from the 37A course with honors, was a distinguished military graduate, a platoon leader in the 371st ASA Company, 1st Cavalry Division, attended Ranger and Airborne qualified. He has a bachelor's degree in Business Administration and is working toward his master's degree in Computer Science. He is currently assigned to the National Training Center as the OIC of the OPFOR EW/REC section.

Intelligence Preparation of the NTC Battlefield

by Robert Francaviglia

The National Training Center at Fort Irwin, Calif., is the most demanding operation environment, short of actual combat, that a unit can ever face. It is not so much a training facility as it is an experiential environment which supports and evaluates training which has gone before.

If a battalion comes to the NTC fully prepared for combat, it can expect a hard fight. The OPFOR motorized rifle regiment is there to expose units to as much of the intensity of the modern battlefield as possible. It fights as aggressively as its Soviet model. As a result of the human element, the OPFOR will make an occasional tactical error. The numerically inferior force can't afford to make any.

FORSCOM's Red Thrust Opposing Force Training Detachment recently completed a study of the problems faced by the Blue Force in engagements with the OPFOR MRR. Most of these problems have at least some roots in a failure to conduct or apply the principles of intelligence preparation of the battlefield.

Stripped of its various technical complexities, IPB is simply synthesizing information in a manner which permits the projection of battlefield events before they occur. Properly performed, it can be used to separate constants from variables, permitting the commander to compress his decision-making environment into manageable elements.

Effective IPB can substantially reduce confusion and preserve command and control. Engagements at the NTC show that command and control loss is a definite problem resulting from the speed and aggressiveness of the tactics, the numerical superiority of the OPFOR and a number of other factors. Furthermore, there have been distinct indications of unfamiliarity with Soviet tactics and organization, some lack of terrain information, and a failure to fully exploit weather

conditions (influencing concealment by smoke, haze, etc.).

It's difficult for a commander to make tactical decisions without that kind of information. It's virtually impossible for him to delegate authority with confidence if he doesn't have some fairly solid data to work with. Providing the commander with this information is the purpose of IPB. As stated in FM 30-5, Combat Intelligence, "the intelligence officer looks for ways to enhance the execution of the commander's mission and recommends appropriate courses of action."

The NTC experience should be treated like an actual combat deployment. That means the S2 should develop his IPB now, at home station, the same as he should for his unit's primary and contingency mission areas.

Effective IPB is a mixture of strategic and tactical considerations. Regular intelligence briefings which point out potential trouble spots, national objectives and developments in potential adversary posture may be strategic, but they are also an initial phase of tactical IPB. They alert the commander to evolving conditions which have impact on his mission. They provide the analytical foundations for tactical employment of forces. On these foundations the commander is able to build his intelligence requirements and his intelligence staff can formulate the tactical data base needed to support future operations.

In all wars, command and control have been firmly linked to communications. There can be no unity of command without effective C³. On the modern battlefield, the means of communication are, for the most part, electronic and technically sophisticated. They are vulnerable to a host of environmental and mechanical anomalies as well as deliberate enemy action. In the tactical arena the more exaggerated our dependency on these delicate communications links becomes, the

greater the danger of our C³ becoming hostage to both enemy radio electronic combat operations and environmental conditions.

The tactical arena, then, produces a quandary. The more intense the engagement, the need to communicate and the potential of not being able to do so increases greatly.

One answer may be found in the living system theory. Organisms with highly sophisticated nervous systems can be seriously affected by relatively minor neural disruption. Attack a "critical node" and the creature is paralyzed. The same is true of organizations, particularly military organizations subjected to the stress and urgency of combat conditions. However, organisms or *organizations* which are decentralized possess semi-autonomous subelements


which can continue to function appropriately even in the absence of command direction.

Of course a decentralized organization contradicts the concept of unity of command, which requires that a single commander or command organization be in a position to make and communicate decisions. How then can we diminish the dependency of military units upon directions communicated via delicate and sophisticated means from upper echelons?

If we free the philosophy of IPB from its methodology (templates, ADP, etc.) and apply it to the C³ problem, a partial solution emerges. When advance information and conclusions regarding relatively constant elements of the battle are maximized, the decisionmaking

environment is compressed and the need to communicate is reduced. As the products of the IPB become more sophisticated and pervasive throughout the organization, an increasing number of variables can be identified as constants or, at least, as a manageable group of "if" statements. More simply put, the more that is understood, the less there is to explain.

For the numerically inferior force, fighting harder won't necessarily guarantee victory, but fighting *smarter* will. Starting the IPB process for the NTC now, before deployment, will make things a lot easier. More importantly, developing and refining the ability to use this vital combat instrument will save a lot of lives on some future battlefield.



XM-330S-jamming the March rotation of the 194th AR BDE at the National Training Center-note the smoke as the battle rages in the background.

SIGINT/EW PULSE

CMF 98 and 33 advanced NCO course explained

by 1st Sgt. Gordon Francis
and SFC Louis Scheffer

The advanced noncommissioned officer course is performance oriented reading, studying, training, practical exercises, physical training, and testing. The eight and one half week course of intensive study and instruction is designed to prepare career soldiers for duties as an E7, platoon sergeant, or comparable position.

How does a soldier get selected for the advanced NCO course? The criteria for selection can be found in AR 351-1, Chapter Six, Section V, Paragraph 6-22 and 6-23. Briefly, soldiers must be in grade E6, have not more than 17 years active federal service as of the beginning of the fiscal year for which selected, and have no more than two years time in grade but less than five.

The CMF 98 EW/Cryptologic Supervisors Course, the ANCOC offered at the U.S. Army Intelligence School, Fort Devens, Mass., is for CMF 98 and CMF 33 NCOs. Upon completion of the CMF 98 ANCOC, 33S NCOs receive additional MOS track training.

ANCOC is composed of seven phases. These phases are leadership, map reading, combat survival skills, professional skills, personnel management/communicative arts skills, electronic warfare operations and Threat instruction.

In the leadership phase, students attend classes on organizational effectiveness, discipline and fraternization, counseling, and the duties, responsibilities and authority of the NCO. They progress from the map reading introduction, which covers the basic uses of a map, to the application of these skills on a compass course.

The professional skills phase includes classes on OPSEC, military

justice, TAMMS, and supply procedures. The personnel skills/communicative arts phase combines military briefings with promotions, reductions, discharges and reserve component information. Combat survival skills classes cover platoon tactics and NBC classes.

All of the phases lead the soldier towards the electronic warfare block of instruction. The map reading, platoon tactics, NBC and military writing and briefing skills are used in the practical exercises of this phase.

During the EW phase, the students receive 12 hours of instruction on CEWI organization and doctrine. They learn how the CEWI units function, what equipment they have and how that equipment and personnel are employed on the battlefield.

After the EW phase, the students move into the Threat phase of the course. They receive 24 hours of Soviet Threat training, and two three-hour blocks of instruction on the North Korean and People's Republic of China Threat. The Threat phase is the last testable portion of the course.

There are 54 hours of nontestable instruction in the course. Students are expected to successfully complete the requirements for effective writing, BTMS platoon trainer's workshop, uniform regulations, and Enlisted Evaluation Report classes. These classes are designed to enhance the students ability to communicate, reward, punish, and lead soldiers in a tactical or strategic environment.

Soldiers selected for promotion to E7 after selection for ANCOC will still attend the course. Those who have not attended ANCOC but have been selected for promotion to E7 will be scheduled to attend the course. The USAISD ANCOC is a dynamic course designed to be responsive to changes from within the system through student critiques and through changes in ARs, FMs, TMs or Army doctrine. Today's NCOs must be flexible and able to adapt to the ever changing situations found in the field station or CEWI environment.

33S course demanding, intense

by SSgt. David B. Washburn

The 33S10 course, taught at the U.S. Army Intelligence School, Fort Devens, Mass., is a 38-week course designed to produce entry level electronics technicians. The course is extremely intense. This is not to scare students away from it, but to make them aware of all facts before they commit themselves to the MOS. The demands placed on the student are great, both academically and militarily.

The instruction begins with 14 weeks of background material in basic electronic theory. The training begins with DC circuit analysis and proceeds to include communications systems and soldering. After successful completion of the basic electronics program, the student moves on to the equipment portion of the course. This portion of the course teaches the student how to troubleshoot and repair SIGINT/EW equipment. Since there are over 2,500 different types of equipment in this field, it is impossible to expose the student to all of them. Instead, USAISD has adopted the training vehicle approach to maintenance training. This means the student is trained to repair "types" of equipment on the premise, for example, that the skills learned while repairing one receiver can be easily transferred to another type of receiver. With this concept in mind, general troubleshooting principles are applied to specific pieces of equipment available for training use.

Upon graduation, students should possess an understanding of electronics higher than that of any other entry-level Army technician. They will be members of one of the Army's smallest and most intensely managed MOSS; there are only about 700 33S personnel in the Army at any one time.

33Ss must be extremely versatile individuals. They could find themselves at a strategic field station, working under time-sensitive conditions with new and sophisticated test equipment on the most complex



Learning how to operate the sequence of the built-in test equipment R-2174, Racal Receiver.

Learning how to isolate problems in Solid State Receiver, AN/GLR-9, using some old and some state of the art test equipment.



Students working to solve troubleshooting problems in the Solid State Receiver, AN/GLR-9.



electronic systems, or they may be assigned to a tactical unit in support of an Army division, working on mobile equipment mounted on armored personnel carriers or trucks. In either assignment, strategic or tactical, the equipment the 33S maintains is complex and sophisticated.

For the individual interested in developing soldiering skills as well as the technical, the 33S field is again wide open. There are 33S jobs that require airborne and Special Forces training. For those who desire to work with a flight crew, there are jobs that put them in aircraft, on flight status. To sum it all up, a 33S is an extremely qualified electronics technician who has met and passed the challenge of one of the toughest academic courses the Army can offer.

Basic Electronics Maintenance Training System to be added to 33S training

Teaching basic electronic theory to 33S10 students has traditionally presented two problems; a high attrition rate, and a scarcity of hands-on reinforcement.

The Electronic Maintenance Division has proposed the Basic Electronics Maintenance Training System to lessen the number of failures and provide hands-on training.

When the system is ready for operation, now projected for early 1985, each student will have a computer console, an electronic trainer and modularized training equipment.

Also available to the students will be 10 consoles in the brigade training area for off-duty study. Each student will proceed at individual pace tracked by a master computer. Also available for individualized instruction will be the indispensable human instructor. The inauguration of this system will result in a lower attrition rate, a more comfortable pace for the student and a better trained 33S10 repairperson.

Military Intelligence

DOPMA

DEFENSE OFFICER PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT ACT

explained

On December 12, 1980, President Carter signed the Defense Officer Management Act (DOPMA) into law, and on September 15, 1981, it became effective. The act was to amend Title 10 of the United States Code as it pertained to the management of officers of all services. With a few exceptions, the major provisions of the new law apply only to management of active duty commissioned officers.

The major provisions of DOPMA include a single set of field grade strength authorizations, a single promotion system, an all regular career force, separation/readjustment pay, uniform constructive credit rules, and rules for transition from the current system.

The grade tables established by DOPMA are sliding scale tables which establish authorizations for each field grade based on the number of "accountable officers" on active duty. "Accountable officers" do not include flag officers, medical or dental officers, warrant officers, or reserve officers on active duty for training. According to the report of the Congressional Committee of Armed Services, the grade tables had three interrelated objectives:

- allow the services to meet requirements for officers in the various grades at ages and levels of experience conducive to effective performance;
- provide career opportunities that will attract and retain the number of high-caliber officers needed;
- provide reasonably consistent career opportunities among the services.

The FY 81 entry figures show that DOPMA authorizes fewer lieutenant colonels and majors on active duty at the time. The act has provisions to allow up to two years to reach those

grade limits. The Army is well on its way to meeting the goals by slightly slowing promotions to both grades. There will be no requirements for a reduction in force as a result of DOPMA grade ceilings.

The new promotion system—Active Duty List promotions—replace the old temporary and permanent promotion systems for both regular Army and reserve officers on active duty. All officers on active duty will be integrated into the active duty list by grade and become eligible for promotion from that list.

While the DOPMA retains the "up-or-out" provisions of the old promotion system, there are some important differences. Previously, the RA major, selected at his 14th year, was guaranteed service until about 21 years—the time required for two non-selects to RA lieutenant colonel is now about 16 years. The RA officer's only "guarantee" of service until and beyond retirement in the new law occurs at promotion to lieutenant colonel (28 years). Officers selected to RA major prior to September 15, 1981 were "grandfathered" under the old rules. Those officers, regular and reserve, twice non-selected to major or lieutenant colonel are now eligible for selective continuation in grade. Selective continuation boards may be convened by the Secretary of the Army to meet Army needs.

DOPMA authorizes each service secretary to establish an all regular career force at the 11th year in the service point. To accommodate this change, the allowable regular Army officer force is increasing to 63,000. The all-regular force is at each service secretary's discretion and is not required by law.

The Secretary of the Army decided to have an all-regular field grade force and to use the promotion point to major as the break

point for regular Army integration. To insure an orderly transition to the regular force, the action will be accomplished in phases and affects officers in three categories differently. Reserve officers on active duty on September 15, 1981, selected to or serving in grade O4 and above were administratively offered RA integration if they met the following basic criteria:

- were U.S. citizens;
- could complete 20 years active federal commissioned service by age 55;
- were physically qualified;
- had no adverse actions pending;
- were not in promotion non-select status.

Those officers had an option of accepting or not accepting RA integration. If they elected to continue service as a reserve officer, they will be released from active duty at 20 years. **Officers in this category who declined integration have until October 1, 1983, to request integration as an administrative action.**

Reserve officers on active duty on September 15, 1981, serving in the company grades are automatically offered RA integration when selected for and promoted to major. These officers also have an option to accept integration or can serve until eligible for a 20 year retirement if they so desire.

Reserve officers commissioned after September 15, 1981, who are selected for promotion to major must accept RA integration or leave active duty. Those electing not to become RA will be considered as leaving active duty voluntarily and will not be eligible for separation pay.

Under the old law, there was provision to compensate an officer involuntarily released from active duty prior to retirement. For regular officers, it was called severance pay and was based on years of commissioned service. For reserve officers, it was called readjustment pay and was based on total years of active service. In both cases, the amount was equal to two months basic pay for each year of service up to a maximum of \$15,000.

Under the new law, the payment is called simply "separation pay" for both regular and reservists and is based on total active service. The

Continued on page 55

Intelligence Training Week



by Capt. John D. Clark and
Capt. Donna L. Kenley

A unique and innovative approach to individual and unit intelligence training was conducted from 16 to 20 November 1981 by the 25th Infantry Division, Schofield Barracks, Hawaii. Selected personnel and equipment representing all the intelligence assets in the division were employed in a multi-subject curriculum designed to meet three training goals: acquaint the individual soldier with the potential threat, introduce and demonstrate to non-MI soldiers the intelligence support available to the division, and increase intelligence awareness throughout the division.

Although focused toward soldiers in grades E4 through E6, the training was a refresher for some and totally new for others. A positive learning environment has been created in which soldiers receive hands-on training with equipment and are not distracted or turned off by tests or official evaluations. Two of the primary responsibilities of each instructor team were to create and sustain a dramatic learning environment and maximize student participation.

Designated Intelligence Training Week, the 25th Infantry Division's training revolves around 18 training stations through which the soldiers are rotated in platoon size elements every 20 minutes. Although hosted

Members of the 3d squadron of the 4th Cavalry briefed soldiers on the U.S. M60A1 tank and the main North Korean battle tank, the T-54. After instruction, the soldiers take the opportunity to get a closer look at the tanks.

and supervised by a specific major subordinate element of the division (e.g. 2nd Brigade, DISCOM), the ITW trains soldiers from every unit within the division, representing almost every MOS. Because unit integrity was stressed, instructors could quickly adjust the thrust and topical emphasis of their subject from group to group.

During the Division Support Command's ITW, soldiers received training in a crucial new aspect of their wartime mission, Rear Area Protection. The division's new emphasis on the RAP mission of the DISCOM soldier was depicted by senior noncommissioned instructors who related Vietnam experiences to demonstrate that the soldier in the division's rear must be prepared to defend himself against a variety of coordinated hostile operations while performing his traditional support role of repairing and replacing the division's combat equipment, providing medical support and services, logistical and technical support, and casualty and replacement management.

It was stressed that deployment to the division's rear does not take the support soldier out of the battle, but makes him a prime target for the

enemy's unconventional warfare, airborne/airmobile, NBC and sabotage operations, a threat for which he must be psychologically and physically prepared. There is no immunity from enemy fire or possible capture and the support soldier will face the enemy's best trained and motivated troops who will assume an unconventional hit-and-run role in trying to disrupt the division's support and maintenance operations and choke off main supply routes.

Because the 25th Infantry Division focuses a considerable amount of attention on the Korean peninsula, the primary goal of ITW was to familiarize each soldier with the North Korean Opposing Forces. A station of the division G2 focused on Korea, its topography, climate, key cultural factors, and a brief history of the 1950-1953 conflict there. This led to a quick but thorough description of the North Korean soldier, his training, equipment, indoctrination, basic tactics, and his political and cultural motivation.

In another station, conducted by the MI company's interrogator/prisoner of war section, students were given a vivid demonstration of the physical and psychological treatment they can expect from potential North Korean POW handlers and interrogators. Extensive use was made of the experiences of U.S. POWs in the Korean War, and the realism was enhanced by the portrayal of North Korean interrogators

by Korean-American military interrogators of the 25th MI Company.

Following the POW scenario, the students rotated to a series of stations that describe and demonstrate their duties as handlers of enemy POWs. Soldiers learned how to fill out the POW Captive Tag, the principles of FM 30-15, the basic "Five Ss" (safeguard, silence, search, segregate and speed) of POW handling, POW rights specified by the Hague and Geneva Conventions, and the SALUTE (size, activity, location, unit, time and equipment) report, the basic intelligence feeder report for all division units in the field.

ITW used all of the division's foreign material training equipment and at least one of each item on hand was displayed and used for foreign materiel orientation and training. Descriptions and demonstrations leading to hands-on familiarization were conducted for the AKM assault rifle, 82mm mortar, B-10 recoilless rifle, RPG-7 grenade launcher and the SAGGER anti-tank guided missile. The T-54 tank orientation was especially effective in a side by side display with its U.S. counterpart, the M60A1. Principal characteristics, capabilities and vulnerabilities of each weapon system were discussed and students were encouraged to climb into the turrets for first hand familiarization. All adversary FMT equipment is systematically integrated with U.S. weapons, tactics and doctrine of opposite capability. This military intelligence related OPFOR training helps soldiers understand how friendly capabilities compare with those of a potential adversary. Other stations compared the 82mm mortar with the U.S. 81mm, the PKM machinegun with the U.S. M60, and the RPG-7, Sagger and B-10 with the LAW, DRAGON and TOW missiles from the U.S. inventory.

Intelligence awareness was increased throughout the division by explaining the capabilities of military intelligence assets. The 372nd ASA Company provided mission briefings and demonstrated electronic warfare and signals security equipment. The 25th MI Company conducted briefings about ground surveillance radar, remote sensors and image interpretation. The display and

demonstration of the actual equipment served as an effective reinforcer. Traditional training in subject areas mandated by AR 350-1 were also conducted, encompassing WIMEA, SIGSEC, OPSEC, SAEDA, and AR 380-13.

The physical execution of a training exercise with the scope of ITW required thorough planning and a determined liaison between the training staff, supporting units and the units that were trained. One of the first considerations was the selection and availability of a location suitable to support 18 static displays and accommodates 600 or



Members of the 25th MI Company demonstrate ground surveillance radar equipment by monitoring traffic on a nearby highway.

more students for several consecutive days, regardless of weather. The 25th Division conducted its ITW at Stoneman Field, a permanent stadium facility with covered bleachers and ample grassy areas. Combining the covered seats with systematic dispersal of other stations using camouflage nets and airmobile tents, station integrity was maintained and distractions kept to a minimum.

Overall preparation and constant follow-up for the ITW was the responsibility of the host unit's S2, with the S3 insuring that the ITW was incorporated into the master training schedules of the attending units. The S3 also tasked the supporting units for instructors, equipment, guard and police details. To ensure a successful training week, continuous liaison with the division G2, the ASA and MI companies and

parent units of the instructor teams was essential. Perhaps the most important ingredient for success was the vocal and unqualified support of the command group and senior staff. Once initial approval and support had been obtained, a comprehensive organizational and control plan was devised to ensure each instructor, every soldier in the rotating units and all support personnel were aware of their responsibilities, the activity location and when each activity was scheduled.

A centralized intelligence coordination center was required to effectively control the 18 training stations, manage 40 instructors, monitor up to 600 students from various units and operational backgrounds, and maintain accountability for a myriad of FMT and support equipment. The ICC had to be centrally located and readily identifiable. It served as a reference point for all personnel in the training area, a communications point and a reception area where senior visitors and other VIPs could be briefed and escorted to the various training sites. The master ITW training schedule and role of the ICC was clearly outlined in a comprehensive LOI issued to all instructors, units to be trained and supporting personnel at least one week in advance of the first training day. Unit/platoon leaders reported to the ICC as soon as their units arrived at the ITW area for confirmation of their first training station and subsequent station rotation. The ICC was also the central point for any instructors having questions or problems. A loudspeaker located at the ICC was used to announce the station rotations and a PRC-77 radio and landline telephone to headquarters ensured communications in the event of weather emergencies or personnel problems.

Organic and supporting units assembled the required tents and camouflage nets and provided a walking guard detail. If regular mess procedures were not practical because of large distances between the training site and a unit's normal duty area, soldiers ate C-rations or had food brought to their location. Chemical latrines and medical personnel were necessary during train-

Continued from page 43

Intelligence Training Week

ing to underscore soldier welfare and morale. Easily accessible water supplies (personal canteens specified in the LOI, lister bags, water fountains, etc.) were other essentials for training success.

Some topics were refined or replaced to better reach a particular target audience, but experience has demonstrated that effective planning and determined effort can result in valuable training for a large number of soldiers in a relatively short period of time.

Capt. John O. Clarke received a BA in Education from the University of Florida. His military schooling includes the Infantry Officer Basic Course, Counterintelligence Course, and the MI Officer Advanced Course. His assignments have included S2 of the 1st Battalion, 7th Infantry, 3rd Infantry Division, Germany; ARIOP, 2nd MIBPRS, 26th TRW, Germany; special security officer, III Corps, Fort Hood, Texas; and S2, 2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, where he implemented the Intelligence Training Week. Capt. Donna L. Kenley is the 25th Infantry Division Support Command S2 at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii. She holds a BA in Political Science from the University of North Carolina and an MA in Political Science from the University of Tennessee. Her military schooling includes the MI Officer Basic Course, Officer Cryptological Course and MI Officer Advanced Course. Previous assignments include company executive officer and Threat instructor at Fort Devens, Mass.; SSO/ATSE and battalion S2, 193rd Infantry Brigade, Fort Clayton, Panama; and assistant brigade S2, 25th Infantry Division. Kenley proposed the Intelligence Training Week.

SQT windows

The Skills Qualification Test windows have been announced for the following intelligence MOSs.

96D—1 April-30 June
96B—1 January-31 March
96C—1 February-30 April
26C—1 July-30 September
97B—1 March-31 May
17K—1 May-31 July
Reserve and National Guard test windows extend three months past the dates listed.

Continued from page 3

ACSI Viewpoint-

the military capabilities that make our adversaries and allies take seriously our diplomacy. That relationship must be understood by MI officers on the Army staff, the Joint Staff, and many of the unified staffs. Many of them will be involved in staff work supporting the development of national military strategy, and they will come into such positions earlier than many of them anticipate.

Q. What do you view as the most significant achievements in Military Intelligence in the past five years?

A. Three things come to mind. First, the fielding of our Military Intelligence (CEWI) Groups and Battalions. The appearance of those organizations at corps and division level mark a threshold in the role of Army intelligence. They give us new responsibility, challenges, and opportunities to affect the combat capabilities of the tactical Army. That change has induced me to recommend to and have approved by the Chief of Staff of the Army a new approach to MI officer career development and especially the plan to begin a single tactical intelligence officer access MOS.

Second is the passing of the 20-year mark for MI branch. We are no longer a collection of officers from other branches. We

have at least two new generations of young officers commissioned in the branch, that have grown up in the branch, and who are impressive in their talents for military skills. The route to the very top of the military intelligence structure has been traveled by one of the Army officers who joined MI branch at its inception in 1962. I have in mind Lt. Gen. James Williams, DIA Director.

Third, if we are to have credibility within the Army, to make our services felt and used adequately in the Army's best interest, we have to gain the confidence of commanders. We have made great progress in this regard, a most critical achievement. We must keep up the trend of growing confidence on the part of the Army command structure. Our future success will always depend upon the quality of the professional competence we bring to bear on our intelligence tasks, beginning at the tactical level and reaching to the level of national military policy.

I want to thank you for this opportunity to answer your questions, and I wish you great success with MI Magazine. It can play an important role in our MI officer professional development.



Officer Notes

Junior Officer Cryptological Program offered

The National Security Agency/Central Security Service established the Junior Officer Cryptological Career Program in June 1971 to broaden the cryptological skills and management practices of junior officers. The three-year program is an excellent opportunity for career-oriented signals intelligence/electronic warfare officers to prepare for future leadership roles in cryptological assignments. Officers who complete the program are awarded Additional Skill Identifier 3W.

The JOCCP consists of a combination of schooling and familiarization assignments at the highest levels of the cryptological community at NSA/CSS, Fort Meade, Md. Participants enroll in approximately 1,000 hours of instruction in signals analysis, technical support writing and computer sciences at the National Cryptologic School. Additionally, officers participate in a series of individually tailored assignments in various locations throughout NSA/CSS to develop an understanding of roles, missions and relationships, and gain experience in cryptologic skills.

Junior officers who hold specialty code 37, SIGINT/EW, as an initial specialty and have a bachelor's degree are eligible to apply. Applicants must have demonstrated outstanding performance and potential in previous assignments. Officers who apply must be available for a three year tour of duty at NSA/CSS, Fort Meade.

Interested eligible officers should write a letter of application which includes date of rank, specialty, years in service and availability date. Applicants should provide a brief summary of military background and a statement of career objectives in the cryptological field. Letters of recommendation may be included but are not required. The application should be sent to **Commander, MIL-**

PERCEN, ATTN: DAPC-OFF-M, 200 Stovall Street, Alexandria, VA 22332.

Selection for the JOCCP is highly competitive. An average of only three or four MI officers enter the JOCCP each year. An informal panel within MI Branch initially screens applications to ensure that eligibility criteria are met. The JOCCP panel at NSA/CSS makes final selection of participants from the list of those eligible.

Questions concerning the JOCCP should be directed to the Professional Development Officer, MI Branch, Autovon 221-0143/0144.

Postgraduate Intelligence Program

The nine-month Postgraduate Intelligence Program, conducted twice a year by the Defense Intelligence School, is one of several special purpose programs available for company grade military intelligence officers, warrant officers and senior civilians. MI Branch is allotted 35 to 40 spaces each fiscal year for officers to attend.

Officers often ask to attend PGIP in lieu of the MI officer advanced course, believing that the two courses are equivalent. Actually, they are very different. A major part of the MIOAC curriculum deals with emerging Army intelligence doctrine, systems, and organizations. Significant portions of MIOAC are designed to bring officers from three different specialties (35, 36, and 37) to the same level of understanding in all three specialties. The emphasis is on Army intelligence in a tactical environment. An MI officer must successfully complete MIOAC to be considered initial specialty qualified. On the other hand, PGIP is for mid-level intelligence professionals, military or civilian, of any DOD service or agency. The curriculum emphasizes national policy and strategic intelligence in a joint environment. It is designed to produce a strategic

intelligence specialty.

The criteria for attendance at PGIP are not always understood. Potential attendees are selected against the following criteria:

- ☐ Hold 35, 36 or 37 Military Intelligence codes, as the initial specialty.
- ☐ Be a company grade officer, and have not attended the resident MIOAC.
- ☐ Possess a bachelor's degree.
- ☐ Have a final top secret security clearance with access to special intelligence certified.
- ☐ Possess a strong tactical intelligence background.
- ☐ Be a graduate of non-resident MIOAC prior to acceptance for entry.
- ☐ Be assignable to strategic intelligence (35B) positions in the National Capital Region or any major command in CONUS or overseas.

Many MI company grade officers do not meet the narrow criteria for PGIP. Disapproval of an application does not reflect adversely on the applicant. Some meet the basic criteria but cannot be selected for other pertinent reasons. A "strong tactical intelligence background" is generally defined as at least three years at corps level and below and experience in more than one intelligence position. Few branch transferees are selected for PGIP, as the resident MIOAC provides a broader view of the Army intelligence and better enables the officer to catch up with his new MI peers.

From the Army point of view, PGIP is a means to prepare an officer for a SC 35B position. However, it is neither required for specialty qualification, nor is it mandatory prior to assignment to SC 35B position.

To apply officers must submit an informal letter to MI branch prior to 30 March for the September class start date or 30 June for the December class start date. Recom-

mentations or endorsements from the chain of command are desired but not mandatory. An officer should include a brief synopsis of SC 35 experience and status regarding completion of MIOAC by correspondence. PGI applications will be considered by a board composed of officers of MI branch.

PGIP students, who obtain approval, may participate in the cooperative degree program to obtain a master of

science in strategic intelligence degree. The MSSSI degree program provides a graduate-level program of study in the principles, operations and management of strategic intelligence. PGI students who are selected to participate in the cooperative program will perform MSSSI work concurrently with the PGI. Cooperative degree participants normally complete the MSSSI requirements after the PGI graduation date. Par-

ticipants who are assigned to the Washington, D.C. area will complete the MSSSI within one year at their new assignment. Officers who are assigned out of the National Capital Region may remain approximately three months after normal PGI graduation to complete the master's degree. PGI students who desire to participate in the MSSSI program are required to obtain prior approval from MI Branch.

Enlisted Notes

Volunteers wanted from Career Management Fields 95, 96 and 98 for airborne training

The Army is experiencing a critical shortage of airborne qualified soldiers serving in MOS 17K, 97B, 98C, 98J and 95B. The MP/MI Branch at MILPERCEN is seeking volunteers for airborne training.

The U.S. Army Infantry Center and School at Fort Benning, Ga. offers a three-week course. To be eligible, soldiers must comply with procedure 3-19, DA Pam 600-8, and the soldier's personnel file should be reviewed by the local personnel office to verify qualification in accordance with chapter six of AR 614-200. Additionally, the personnel office can advise of special pay and promotion incentives available to airborne qualified soldiers. Soldiers who volunteer will be provided a stabilized assignment at Fort Bragg, N.C. or Fort Devens, Mass. upon completion of airborne training.

Interested soldiers should submit

DA 4187 (Personnel Action Request), through channels to MILPERCEN, ATTN: DAPC-EPT-F, Alexandria, Va. 22331. A current copy of DA Form 2 and 2-1 (Personnel Qualification Records Part I and II), DA Form 705 (Army Physical Readiness Test Scorecard completed within 30 days of submission) and SF 88 (Report of Medical Examination) must be attached to each application.

Point of contact at MILPERCEN MP/MI Branch is SSgt.(P) Roby, Autovon 221-0415/6430 or commercial (202) 325-0415/6430.

Specialty Proponency

Foreign language maintenance through extension courses

Do you want to enhance your foreign language capability? Does your unit need to improve the quality of language products? The Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center is producing written texts and cassette tapes under the auspices of the Army training extension course program expressly for

the purpose of upgrading language proficiency. These high-quality materials are now being produced under the title of Professional Development Program Extension Courses.

The current PDPECs concentrate on the interrogator modes of instruction; however, these courses are beneficial for all linguists who want to improve their military terminology. Each course covers the preparation, approach, questioning and termination phases of a tactical interrogation. Lessons are struc-

tured around such subjects as organization, strength, weapons, mission, tactics and training. The courses are currently available in German, Chinese, Korean, Czech, Egyptian, Iraqi and Syrian.

PDPEC materials are being distributed directly to military units who employ linguists using a ratio of one set per three linguists. Requests for additional sets should be sent through normal TEC channels to the Defense Language Institute, Foreign Language Center, ATTN: ATFL-DT-N, Presidio of Monterey, CA 93940.



Counterpoint, MI Magazine's newest department, is designed to give you, the MI practitioners in the field, an opportunity to voice your opinions and be heard by the MI community.

In the October-December 1982 issue, we presented this question to our readers, "Now that CEWI has moved from concept to reality, is it a viable operation and will it meet the intelligence and electronic warfare requirements of the AirLand battle?"

Here are some of your responses:

The reality of CEWI as embodied in a CEWI group (corps) is all that planners hoped it would be: a fusion of intelligence assets at corps level under a single commander and a single tasking authority. As such, it has successfully fulfilled a critical need, that of enabling the corps commander to apply his tactical intelligence assets in a concerted and efficient manner that was heretofore impossible. As to whether CEWI will "meet the requirements of the AirLand battle," that depends more upon the availability and quality of CEWI personnel than upon the CEWI organization itself. That quality is very high at present—but the availability of trained, experienced personnel in tactical MI skills in the event of mobilization presents a problem that the Army has yet to resolve adequately.

Capt.(P) Robert B. Nichol
504th MI Group (CEWI)(Corps)

CEWI has shown the military community at Fort Campbell that tactical commanders can receive timely and useable intelligence support from both DS and GS elements of the battalion. During the division FTX EAGLE STRIKE III conducted in December 1982, the TCAE was able to provide a brigade task force much needed information, while remaining responsive to the division commander's EEI. Additionally, those

CEWI assets DS to the TF were able to produce the best support possible down to company level. The equipment shortfalls facing CEWI are without a doubt the greatest hindrance facing U.S. Army intelligence in the tactical arena of the AirLand battle. Until this single issue is resolved, available intelligence support remains sharply degraded on the extended battlefield. The air assault doctrine being developed at Fort Campbell has produced expanded areas of influence and interest at all levels of command. The valid requirements of this extended battlefield far exceed those capabilities organic to the 311th MI Battalion (CEWI).

Capt.(P) Chris H. Lugenbill
HHC, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault)

The only answer I could possibly consider is "no."

Lines of communication for relay of information, both vertically and laterally (i.e. intelligence reporting), are cumbersome, often confusing, and in some cases nonexistent. In dealing with real-time reporting of tactical intelligence information in a combat situation, reporting channels are extremely erratic, and often depend on equipment which is unreliable. Message formatting adds to an already cumbersome system of real-time reporting, which can lead to excessive delays in initial report-

ing, delays in relaying the information and, worst of all, can lead to receiving parties misunderstanding the information.

Until recently, the misuse of enlisted personnel in the intelligence field was widespread at the tactical direct support units. This has decreased to some extent in the past couple years, but it is still a major problem. A prime example of this is the emphasis of targeting TLQ-17 and GLQ-3 operators against U.S. communications while neglecting critical technical knowledge and language skills required in a combat situation.

The number of available pieces of equipment for intercept should be at least doubled. With the advent of a European conflict, it may be assumed that the services of both field stations will be lost, and that there is a dearth of both positions and operators to take up the slack. Until such time as the CEWI (and AEB) units are given some priority—besides last—on equipment issue and upgrading, they simply cannot be effective.

Sgt. Robert A. Lippincott
CPAR, CONUS MI Group

No, the TOE unit does not allow for the existing elements to meet the needs of the units they support. Under the ASA concept, the ASA units had an easier time supporting the units. They had their own sup-

port elements, i.e. MPs, cooks, mechanics, etc. The mismanagement of the unit is a large part of the problem, i.e. the G2 trying to build his own empire with the CEWI battalion.

Even though under the old system the intelligence assets were widely dispersed, the expertise was controlled by the proper personnel. All the misassignment of the expertise in the intelligence field, i.e. 98C4LKP assigned to a unit in Europe, greatly reduces the working aspect of such an individual as he/she has to spend a large amount of time learning a new problem and is of no value to the unit until the problem is learned.

SFC Robert M. Meyer
HHOC, S3, 108th MI Battalion
(CEWI)

Tactical requirements (vehicle maintenance, mandatory training, etc.) and unrealistic training exercises (FTXs, CPXs, FCXs), compounded with misassignment and misuse of EW linguists have resulted in MOS and language proficiency that is far below minimum standards.

Spec. 4 J.R. Lee
108th MI Battalion (CEWI)

The TOE in many elements still need major revisions in both personnel and equipment strength. The existing personnel and equipment needed are not being fielded quickly enough. The NCO and officer corps are being overwhelmed with critical tasks which require too much time away from the troops. The concept is fine on paper, but until a true base of experience can be established it will remain a concept.

SFC James K. Hill
108th MI Battalion (CEWI)

Our Counterpoint question for the April-June issue is: "If intelligence is 'one of the main equalizers' for the AirLand Battle, are we prepared to meet the IEW challenges?" If yes, how are we prepared? If no, what preparation is necessary?

Please send your response to MI Magazine, Box 569, Fort Huachuca, Arizona 85613, or phone Autovon 879-3609, USAICS hotline. Please give your name and unit.

USAICS Notes

37 courses move to Fort Huachuca

by SP5 Robert A. Kerr

In April 1982, a special task force was created to move the officer specialty 37 (Electronic Warfare/Cryptology) courses to the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School at Fort Huachuca, Ariz., from the U.S. Army Intelligence School Fort Devens, Mass. The 10 full-time members of the task force, drawn from positions throughout USAICS, all had extensive and recent field experience in the EW intelligence field. In six months, the task force created the new 37A and 37B courses from scratch and were ready for the first students to begin studies in October 1982.

The 37 courses were moved to USAICS in an attempt to centralize all military intelligence officer courses at one location. Nearly all sections of USAICS became involved in supporting the process of writing, updating and improving course lesson plans. Visiting officers and warrant officers were asked to review the plans. Field units were solicited for feedback. All possible input was gathered and considered in course preparations.

The first 37 courses at Fort Huachuca began 11 October with common block instruction. Members of the task force became instructors, now known as the SIGINT/EW Team.

The 37A (Electronic Warfare/Signals Intelligence Tactical Operations Officer) course has been extended to 15 weeks from its former 11-week format. The 37B (Strategic Signals Intelligence Officer) course has expanded from eight weeks to 10. One major addition to the 37A course is a five-day field training exercise at a Combat Electronic Warfare Intelligence organization in CONUS. CEWI units host the 37A students on a rotational basis and provide them with a chance to work in a tactical environment. Another method of informing the students about what to expect in the field is through seminars with officers

returning to Fort Huachuca for advanced courses. Often the student officers can meet with officers from the units they are heading for or the officers they are actually replacing.

CEWI unit SOPs have also been gathered to help the students know what to expect. Units where 37Bs might be assigned have sent videotapes to orient students with their particular situations.

Both 37As and 37Bs can expect to visit the National Security Agency at Fort Meade, Md., for five days of temporary duty enroute to their new duty stations. This TDY is designed to familiarize the graduates with the NSA and what it can do for them.

Not all training is specifically specially related. The courses have been designed to include training on other duties the officers may encounter at field units. The instruction has been carefully designed to prevent repetition of material already covered by the MI Officer Basic Course and is intended to expand and detail information the officer should already know.

As already mentioned, almost every section of USAICS has contributed to the course in some way. In addition, the Intelligence and Security Board has agreed to demonstrate to the students any new equipment it is testing. The 11th Signal Brigade at Fort Huachuca provides COMSEC briefings in a field environment.

As it is Army-wide, procurement has been slow. The courses have some equipment and when all that has been ordered arrives, the courses will have every piece of equipment a CEWI unit could possibly have. For the time being, the Training Aids Section of USAICS has created mock-ups of the missing equipment.

The SIGINT/EW Team hopes to make improvement of the courses a continuing process. Graduates of the courses are encouraged to provide feedback. As new methods and

systems are created, they are added to the course plan. Visiting officers and warrant officers are still asked to review lesson plans and provide input.

First two Mobile Army Image Interpretation Centers fielded

Army image interpretation came into sharp focus recently with the fielding of two Mobile Army Ground Imagery Interpretation Centers. The Combat Surveillance and Target Acquisition Laboratory, and element of the U.S. Army Electronics Research and Development Command, turned over two operational systems to U.S. Army Europe.

One system was installed at Zweibrücken Air Force Base in Germany where it will be operated by the 581st Military Intelligence Detachment. The second was installed at the Royal Air Force-Alconbury in the United Kingdom, where it will be used by the 582nd Military Intelligence Detachment.

The MAGIIC is a two-shelter, computer assisted intelligence dissemination facility. Its minicomputers, large intelligence data base and automated aerial photographic exploitation stations provide state-of-the-art tools for rapid exploitation of aerial photography.

Intelligence reports can be sent over the automatic digital network, tactical teletype and digital data link communication subsystems organic to each imagery center shelter.

The MAGIIC is the first tactical system certified by the Defense Communications Agency for direct tie-in with the automatic digital network.

The fielding of the first two systems does not complete the work of the imagery center team. Four more systems will be fielded next year in Korea and the U.S.

(This article originally appeared in the November-December 1982 issue of **Army R, D&A Magazine**.)

Professional Reader

Electronic Warfare: Element of Strategy and Multiplier of Combat Power, by Don E. Gordon. Permagon Press, Inc. 1981. 104 pages. \$16.00

Electronic Warfare, by Col. Don "Flash" Gordon, is a well-researched and documented account of the history of EW in modern battle. In this book, Gordon evaluates the role EW has played during the past 40 years and gives a detailed historical perspective of the use of EW during World War II, leading up to the present time. Aside from being well-written, this book is also chock full of "nuggets of information" rarely found anywhere else at the unclassified level. The author sees a definite need to fight the next war with futuristic concepts instead of merely refighting the last one. In his book, Gordon provides an outline on how EW can best be used to insure that success in battle comes to the army that is better prepared to fight in this, the fourth dimension of combat.

Electronic Warfare is an absolute must for the historian or military enthusiast, and is a book which belongs on the professional reading list of every military intelligence officer.

**Capt. Albino S. Leal
DOTD Threat Team**



The Defense Policies of Nations: A Comparative Study edited by Douglas J. Murray and Paul R. Viotti. The John Hopkins University Press. 1982. 525 pages. \$35.00 hardcover, \$12.95 paperback.

The Defense Policies of Nations, edited by Douglas J. Murray and Paul R. Viotti is an excellent primer in comparative political science, featuring a selection of well-written political treatises by varied authors. The editors provide the reader with an excellent overview on how strategic defense policies of different nations are formulated. The book itself is constructed along a very easy to follow format, concentrating on covering the general political environment. Also included is an in-depth analysis of current U.S. and Soviet strategic thought and how super-power policies shape the course of world events. Detailed coverage is given to minor powers on a regional basis.

The Defense Policies of Nations is well-written and organized, replete with case studies offering in-depth coverage of significant past events and which presents relatively new insight into present and future trends and developments. The book has few graphic illustrations, however, those present add to the understanding of the topic at hand and serve to provide excellent comparison and contrast.

This book will appeal to historians and military intelligence officers who desire to round out their knowledge of world events, in that it provides essential political background on strategic policies of nations which hold implications for the U.S. armed forces.

**Capt. Albino S. Leal
DOTD Threat Team**



Auschwitz-Birkenau

Dino A. Brugioni

During World War II, photographic interpretation was a much used and essential tool of the Allied military intelligence effort. Literally millions of aerial photographs were taken of enemy areas, including heavy coverage of Germany and German-occupied lands. The many thousands of photo interpretation reports based on those photographs have been preserved in the archives, along with the prints and negatives.

I was a member of a bomber crew during World War II, but I have devoted practically all the rest of my professional career to the field of photographic interpretation. In the course of my work, I frequently had occasion to do research in the World War II photographic intelligence files. In 1978, while researching the files with a colleague, Mr. Robert Poirier, we discovered aerial photos of the Auschwitz-Birkenau Extermination Complex that had been overlooked during and after the war period.

As part of my official duties, I frequently lectured on various aspects of photographic interpretation, using photographs to illustrate my subjects. Whenever I have shown the photographs of the extermination complex, the most frequently asked questions have been: Why did not or why could not the World War II photo interpreters identify the horrifying activities perpetrated at this complex? How could something so hideous have been overlooked? Why did not the photo interpreters note the unusually large size and unique configuration of Birkenau and know that it was not a conventional "prison camp?" Why were the large number of boxcars on the Birke-

Why the World War II Photo Interpreters Failed to Identify the Extermination Complex

nau sidings never questioned, considering the obvious lack of industrial installations within the camp? Most importantly, why did not the photo interpreters spot the four separately secured extermination areas, each of which contained unique facilities—an undressing room, a gas chamber and a crematorium?


I have gone back and searched the records and reports produced by the concerned reconnaissance units and interpretation organizations. I have also analyzed the interpretation practices and priorities of the time and have concluded that five major factors influenced these shortcomings:

1. **Tasking**—This is a military intelligence term meaning requirements imposed—on a photo interpreter, for instance, to procure specific information needed to formulate intelligence about a specific enemy target or targets. During World War II, photo interpreters operated under an elaborate tasking and priority system to produce intelligence from aerial photography. Searching for or doing detailed analysis on concentration camps was not a specific task. Photographs were searched to find any indication of

enemy build-up or military movements. This was called first-phase exploitation. Of prime concern were concentrations or movements of troops which posed threats to Allied operations, either current or planned. In addition, the photographs were scanned for evidence of reprisal weapons (V-1 and V-2 rocket sites), flak and searchlights, coastal defenses, material dumps and depots, camps and barracks, fieldworks and defense lines, construction work or demolition activity, and road, rail, port and inland waterway transport activity. As D-day approached, coastal shipping, beach obstacles, mine fields and strongpoints were added to the watch list.

Photo interpreters were also tasked to perform detailed analysis on a variety of significant tactical and strategic targets. Concentration and extermination camps were not considered significant targets. A target folder was created for each significant target and was described at the time as being the interpreters' "most important aid." The target folder contained the target requirement, a night target map, a small-scale illustration of the target, a large-scale illustration of the target with annotations and a target information sheet giving all known information with regard to the target.

The target chart for the Auschwitz (Oswiecim) area was centered on the I.G. Farben "Buna" Synthetic Fuel and Rubber Plant and did not include either the Auschwitz I or Birkenau camps. The specific detailed interpretation tasking was to report on the progress of the construction of the plant. Later, an added requirement was to report on the extent and effect of Allied bombing. A review of all the photo



Alignment of the Farben Plant with the
Auschwitz and Birkenau Camps
National Archives and Records Center
Photo

interpretation reports created on the Farben plant reveals the interpreters' principal concern was the bomb damage and production stoppages at the synthetic fuel plant. There is not a single reference to either the Auschwitz or Birkenau camps, which were covered on the same photographic runs. The Monowice camp, next to the Farben Plant, was correctly identified as a concentration camp.


2. Priority Projects—The principal units performing interpretation of the photographs taken

over Germany and German-occupied territories were the Allied Central Interpretation Unit at the Royal Air Force Station Medmenham in England and the Mediterranean Allied Photo Reconnaissance Wing in Italy. These organizations worked on a 24-hour-a-day basis and in 1943 and 1944 were heavily involved in the planning of the Normandy and Southern France landings. Support to the Normandy landings alone required an estimated half-million photo interpretation man-hours. The stepped-up Allied bombing offensive of German strategic industries in 1944, which included synthetic fuel plants, also involved extensive

photographic analysis and assessments. Other high priority projects included the searching for and destruction of V-1 and V-2 rocket sites, jet aircraft plants, and submarine production facilities. Photo interpreters were also employed in the planning and execution of special bombing missions against critical targets. The volume of materials being received for photo interpretation must also be considered. The daily intake for the Allied Central Interpretation Unit averaged 25,000 negatives and 60,000 prints. By V-E Day, over five million prints were in storage. More than 40,000 reports had been prepared from these prints.

January-March 1983

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After the selection process was completed, those physically fit for heavy manual labor were processed through a registration system which culminated in numbers being tattooed on their arms prior to their being quarantined and assigned to work details.

Photo National Archives and Records Center


3. Training—Interpreter trainees were normally sent to a four-to six-week course which explained the identification of military equipment—airplanes, tanks, artillery, ships and the like. Senior photo interpreters, organized in sections, worked on more specific subjects such as strike photography, bomb damage assessments, rail and road transportation, ports and shipping, military installations, inland waterway transportation, aircraft

plants and airfields, radar and electronics, underground installations, V-1 and V-2 installations, enemy defenses, armor and artillery and petroleum refineries. No photo interpreters were assigned to do detailed interpretation on concentration or extermination camps. As nearly as I can determine, no tasking was ever imposed to conduct aerial reconnaissance of such camps. Photography that was acquired of these camps was a by-product of the reconnaissance of nearby strategic installations.

Since photo interpreters were not directed to locate or interpret such camps, they did not try to determine which camps were unique or different, that is, those which contained gas chambers

and crematoriums.

Photo interpreters were provided with hundreds of so-called photographic keys to aid them in identification of newly photographed targets. These keys were manuals, each containing photographs of a previously identified target. Annotations and text provided guidance on the unique characteristics (called "indicators" or "signatures") of targets which could be used to identify a newly photographed target. No such keys were prepared about any of the various types of installations involved in what is now known as the Holocaust. For that matter, no photo interpreters experienced in identifying such installations were available to compile such keys.



The crematoriums overburdened, the dead are buried in trenches or burned in large open pits. Smoke can be seen rising from one of the pits near gas chamber No. 5.

Photo National Archives and Records Center

There was a key prepared on a typical labor or construction camp. The existence of such a camp was often an indication or "signature" of a nearby underground production installation or of nearby construction of coastal defenses along the French coast. Therefore, during the latter part of the war, photo interpreters were tasked to look for such labor and construction camps.

No detailed photo intelligence study was ever done on any of the major concentration camps;

in truth, no distinctions were ever made among the various types of camps. A variety of descriptive terms were used indiscriminately, although some of the camps were much larger and more complex than others. The following terms were used to describe these camps: slave labor camps, labor camps, construction camps, forced labor camps, prisons, concentration camps and internment camps. The most frequent and descriptive term used, however, was "huttid camp." This term, of British derivation, was originally used to describe a series of prefabricated buildings similar in appearance to British Nissen huts or the later American quonset huts, and was carried over into the interpretation field.

The term "extermination camp" was never used in any of this reporting.

In searching the aerial photography, the photo interpreters would have had little difficulty spotting the hundreds of concentration camps in Germany and German-occupied lands. They were usually set in forested areas or valleys, apart from towns and cities. The camps were surrounded with barbed wire and watch towers. The barracks buildings did not conform to known forms of architecture. They were, for the most part, of wooden construction, mostly one story and of several standard sizes. Most were prefabricated. Frequently, the administrative buildings and guards' quarters

were in a separate enclosure, often near the main gate of the camp.

The main effort in World War II, with respect to camps, was to locate those which contained Allied prisoners of war. In this effort, the photo interpreters were provided pertinent data and the locations of specific camps. In addition to the barracks and security features, other indicators were provided which the inter-

preters could use in making identification. No associated industrial plants were near POW camps in most cases. Most of the POW camps had an exercise area. The barracks were usually arranged on both sides of a central street and a cleared area separated the barracks from the enclosure wall. The extensive open area between the barracks and enclosure was intended to prevent escapes.

4. Precedence—Photo interpreters depend heavily on precedence or existing knowledge about a subject or installation. I did not find a single reference in which interpreters were told to look for the gas chambers and crematoriums that were killing

thousands each day. There simply was no historical or intelligence precedence for genocide on such a scale. Most World War II interpreters I have spoken to found the concept unbelievable, unimaginable and completely incongruous. For that matter, most of the general public of Allied countries were unaware of the genocide activities during the war.

It must be quickly added, however, that during World War II information from human sources and communication intelligence was not available to most interpreters. Photo interpreters, for the most part, worked in a vacuum while interpreting and reported only what they saw on

German reconnaissance after the Soviet capture reveals that all of the gas chambers and crematoriums have been destroyed along with the loot storage area.

National Archives and Records Center
Photo



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
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the photography. My research also confirms that the information about Auschwitz provided by two escapees, Rudolf Vrba and Alfred Wetzler, was never made available to those interpreting the I.G. Farben Plant photos. It is my professional opinion that had such information been provided to the photo interpreters, they would have quickly located the gas chambers and crematoriums.


5. Photo Interpretation

Equipment—By modern standards, the photo interpretation equipment used in World War II can only be classified as primitive. Photo interpreters used stereoscopes with lenses capable of magnification four times the original imagery (about like that of a magnifying glass). In addition, tube magnifiers with a seven-time magnification capability were also used in scanning the aerial photos. Photo interpreters performed the interpretation from contact paper prints rather than film duplicates. We know today that the negatives from which some of the Auschwitz contact prints were made in World War II could have been enlarged up to 35 times.

Concomitant with the tragic failure of photo interpreters to identify the Auschwitz-Birkenau Extermination Complex was the equally tragic failure of major Allied air commands to be aware that aerial photography of the complex existed. There had been numerous appeals from many sources to bomb the complex, the railyards, the rail bridges and rail lines leading to Auschwitz. Those appeals reached the highest levels, including Prime Minister Winston Churchill and President Franklin D. Roosevelt. When the bombing specialists were ordered to formulate plans for bombing the Auschwitz-Birkenau Extermination Complex, officials of the Air Ministry, the Royal Air Force Bomber Command and the U.S. 8th Air Force bemoaned the lack of aerial photographic coverage

of the complex. In fact, such photos were readily available at the Allied Central Interpretation Unit at Royal Air Force Station Medmenham, 50 miles outside of London and at the Mediterranean Allied Photo Reconnaissance Wing in Italy. The ultimate irony was that no search for the aerial photos was ever instituted by either organization.

In retrospect, it is a fact that by the time the Soviet army reached Auschwitz on January 27, 1945, the Allies had photographed the Auschwitz-Birkenau Extermination Complex at least 30 times.



Mr. Dino A. Brugioni points out details while colleague Robert Poirier holds an aerial photo of the Birkenau death camp during a press conference at the National Archives on February 23, 1979.

Brugioni recently retired from the Central Intelligence Agency, where he served as a senior official and an aerial reconnaissance and photo interpreter expert. During World War II, he flew bombing missions and reconnaissance missions over North Africa, Italy, France, Germany and Yugoslavia. In 1979, he was awarded the National Intelligence Study Center's award for the best scholarly article for a detailed analysis of aerial photography of the Nazi death camps at Auschwitz-Birkenau featured in the April issue of *Life Magazine*. He has appeared on ABC's "20/20", "Good Morning America" and "Nightline."

DOPMA—Continued from page 41

amount is 10 percent of annual base pay for each year of service up to a maximum of \$30,000.

The act also makes law the equal treatment of female officers as regards to appointment, promotion, accountability and mandatory retirement. The act does not, however, change any part of the "combat exclusions policy."

Constructive service credit is a method for recognizing the time spent in formal education required for service in a "professional" service beyond a bachelor's degree. This applies generally to doctors and dentists, but in some cases can include lawyers. It gives the officer credit for time in service, time in grade and seniority on the active duty list.

Generally, transition provisions provide for an orderly changeover to the new system. They contain rules which "grandfather" those officers who were on active duty when the law was enacted with respect to pay, promotions and retirement. The transition provides for the graduate accomplishment of the field grade strength limits and the administrative integration of field grade officers into the regular Army.

The DOPMA is an organized approach to long range management for the officer corps. It uses an integrated system of field grade strength limitations, specific promotion opportunity guidelines and a regular force to provide for a dedicated, experienced corps of officers prepared to serve and lead in time of war or national emergency.

Editor's note: This article is taken from sections of Lt. Col. Stephen L. Ammon's article "Defense Officer Personnel Management Act," in the September-October 1982 issue of **Soldier Support Journal**. Ammon is a member of the Officer Systems Analysis Group, Office of Personnel Management Directorate in the U.S. Army Military Personnel Center.

OPFOR

Heliborne operations

The ability to employ heliborne forces is a facet of Soviet operations which is too often ignored in training scenarios which purport to present U.S. forces with a Soviet-like adversary. The recent, and continuing, decentralization of control of helicopters and the creation of specialized air assault units within the Soviet ground forces should provide an incentive to include at least a notional portrayal of heliborne operations in OPFOR scenarios.

The OPFOR front has an air assault brigade with approximately 2,000 personnel, and an airmobile assault brigade with approximately 1,700 personnel. Additionally, motorized rifle troops from the OPFOR motorized rifle divisions are capable of conducting heliborne operations. Some MRDs have organic helicopter squadrons or helicopter detachments which can be used to insert troops, as well as provide "airborne artillery" support.

OPFOR doctrine allows for the insertion of heliborne units up to 50 kilometers forward of the line of contact, or 100 kilometers forward of ground units in a tactical march. For most OPFOR scenarios, however, heliborne forces—battalion size or smaller—will be assigned tactical objectives within the range of divisional artillery. OPFOR heliborne units supporting divisional operations will be inserted during daylight hours up to 15 kilometers forward of the line of contact, and will attempt to link up with advancing OPFOR maneuver units within 12 hours of their insertion.

An exception would be a heliborne force employed as a forward detachment. The forward detachment may be inserted up to 100 kilometers forward of the division to seize key terrain or to conduct a raid. Other exceptions are special purpose forces, reconnaissance teams, sabotage teams and small raiding parties, which may be inserted up to 100 kilometers deep into Blue Force territory and are considered "expendable."

Tactical missions for which the employment of heliborne forces is appropriate include:

- Seizure of key terrain, such as fording sites, bridges, choke points, passes, oases, crossroads or beach exits.
- Destruction of Blue Force C³ facilities.

- Disruption of Blue Force support activities.
- Pursuit, or blocking the withdrawal of a Blue Force unit.
- Attacking Blue Force defenses from the rear.
- Setting up ambushes.
- Reacting to an unexpected threat from the flank or rear.

Heliborne forces supporting a MRD will be composed of elements of a BTR-equipped motorized rifle regiment, and will be tailored for the specific mission. Missions conducted in support of a OPFOR army, or the front, will be conducted by specialized troops from either the air assault brigade or the airmobile assault brigade.

Conduct of operations

Loading: Loading areas will be located out of range of Blue Force artillery. Personnel, weapons and equipment will be prepared for loading before the helicopters arrive. Helicopters which take the longest to load will arrive first. As loading of cargo is completed, other helicopters will arrive, and troops will load quickly.

Movement to the objective: As with airborne operations, air superiority, or at least parity, is critical to the success of heliborne operations. Although heliborne units will travel shorter distances into Blue Force airspace and will fly at lower altitudes, OPFOR helicopters often will



have fighter escorts—particularly if the operation is in support of an army or the front. Artillery and ground-attack aircraft will be used to suppress Blue Force air defenses along the flight corridors. Helicopters will travel routes which provide terrain masking when possible.

Landing areas: If possible, the helicopter landing area will be on the objective. If the objective is defended, the HLA will be as close as possible, but beyond the range of Blue Force direct-fire weapons. If the terrain will not permit the helicopters to land, and the HLA is not defended, troops will be unloaded by using ropes or ladders, by rappelling or by jumping from hovering helicopters.

A final reconnaissance of the HLA will be conducted by an OPFOR aircraft moments before the landing. The primary method of suppressing Blue Forces in the landing area will be strikes by ground-attack aircraft—both fixed wing aircraft and attack helicopters.

Actions on the objective: If the objective is a key terrain feature, the heliborne forces will establish defensive positions and await link-up. If the heliborne unit is to conduct a raid, it will move from the HLA to the objective as quickly as possible, attempting to attack before the element of surprise evaporates. In a raid, the attacking unit normally will have a specific target, such as a particular facility, installation, or weapon system. All efforts will be focused on destroying the target. Survivors will move to designated areas, normally **not** the original landing zones, where they may, or may not, be extracted.

If U.S. Army units, staffs and commanders are to be confronted with a credible opponent during training exercises, it is important that the OPFOR be portrayed as having the ability, and willingness, to conduct aggressive heliborne operations. A future article will address in detail the tactics of the OPFOR air assault brigade and airmobile brigade.

Questions, comments or suggestions regarding OPFOR articles should be addressed to: Commander, USAICS, ATSI-TD-CTO (ATTN: Mr. Moorehead), Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613.

January-March 1983

Professional Reader

Strategic Military Deception, Edited by Donald C. Daniel and Katherine L. Herbig, Pergamon Press, New York, 1982.

Stories of strategic military deception have been common since the fall of Troy. The memoir literature on World War II strategic military deceptions alone fills several book shelves. But most of this writing is historical or anecdotal, not analytical or theoretical. There is no real science of strategic military deception; it remains an art. In an effort to put deception on a more strategic footing, government-sponsored studies have attempted to apply the physical and social sciences to analyze how and why military deceptions work. The physical sciences have succeeded in revealing many deceiver's tricks: e.g. infrared films penetrate camouflage, radio fingerprinting techniques frustrate various forms of the *funkspiel* game. This volume is an attempt to use social sciences to construct an analytical framework for studying deception and to develop a theory of deception. It is a ground breaking effort, an initial venture into new territory by a large team of researchers, most of whom are faculty of the Naval Postgraduate School.

Strategic Military Deception is divided into chapters grouped into three sections: a conceptual framework, a series of analytical chapters based on different social sciences (psychology, communications theory, organizational theory), and several historical case studies. The editors intended that the analytical chapters would expand and elaborate the conceptual framework, and that the historical chapters would serve as tests of the framework. The plan was a good one but it did not come off. The analytical chapters do not closely address the conceptual framework (or each other), and the historic cases are not framed to directly test the analyses.

The reader is left with a handful of loosely related pieces rather than a well-knit tool for dissecting military deception. Nevertheless, there are many valuable fragments in the

volume that the next team embarking on this conceptual trek should and could use. The book provides more than it delivers, but it still provides much that is new and useful.

Deception rarely fails the strategist who uses it. It tends to enhance surprise and thus increases the chances of victory. This is one of the counter-intuitive conclusions of Sherwin and Whaley's chapter of statistical analysis of 93 modern strategic military deceptions. Another surprise is that leaks seem not to matter much, if at all. Deceptions with air-tight security and no warnings to the opponent seem to fare no better statistically than those preceded by many leaks and warnings. Perhaps this is because one objective of deception is confusion, and deception leaks heighten confusion as well as convey information. The main objective of security may be to keep our own side ignorant of what is happening, thus maintaining the plausibility of the deception (if not its security). A ruse is far more effective if your own people do not believe it, and an enemy can hardly be faulted for falling victim to something one's own side also disbelieves (until it happens).

Another precious fragment in this volume is R.F. Hesketh's "Except from Fortitude: A History of Strategic Deception in North Western Europe, April 1943 to May 1945." This eyewitness account (of which only a summary is reprinted) details the "bodyguard of lies" woven to conceal the time and place of the Allied invasion of Western Europe from Hitler and his minions. Judging from this fragment, the entire history would make an excellent contribution to deception literature.

The analytic chapters of **Strategic Military Deception** are the least satisfying. Social scientists and scholars of deception analysis will find many recent, relevant studies missing. The beginner will find various confusions: e.g. what Sherwin terms communications theory in his chapter "The Organizational Approach" has no resemblance to Reese's chapter on "A Communications Theory Framework." The two chapters using

psychological theories, by Heuer and Sarbin, come to opposite conclusions: Heuer wants to reinforce counterdeception analysts' analytic powers; Sarbin recommends that they should rely on their intuitions.

There are historic case studies on Soviet, Allied and German deceptions in World War II, on the 1973 Middle East War, on Chinese wars and on the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. All provide some new and useful historic data, although some (e.g. the account of Barbarossa) suffer when compared to book-length historical analyses (Whaley's **Code-word Barbarossa** remains the definitive treatment). Overall, the historians' contributions were more pointed and direct than those of the social scientists.

Because the editors were unable to get their various teams to pull in a single direction, it is hard to evaluate Daniel and Herbig's theory chapters on "*Propositions on Military Deception*" and "*Deception and Theory in Practice*." If one treats their efforts as a deception and counterdeception "weapons system," their intent is obvious: "to illuminate the nature of deception, its processes, and factors that condition when one resorts to and succeeds at deception." Given the mixed bag in this volume, it is much more difficult to assess their system's operational capability. More data from the lab and the field will be needed, but it is a significant start.

Capt. Frank Stech
97th USARCOM

Po Sledam Svoey Divizii (On the Trail of Their Division),
Monakhov, I.P., Moscow:
DOSAAF, 1981, 95 pp.

This little book is a rare example of the conduct of military intelligence within the Soviet Union. But there are these caveats: it is in Russian; it deals with World War II units and operations; it concerns civilians investigating the military; and is a book for school children. Inspired by a speech by Leonid Brezhnev encouraging children to learn about the exploits of the Soviet armed forces during World War II, the middle school at Milyakhovo in Vladimir Oblast' decided to investigate the his-

tory of a unit formed in its area at the start of the war, the 262nd Red Banner Order of Suvorov "Demidov-Khingai" Rifle Division. This work was undertaken primarily by the book's author, a veteran of that division, and currently a reserve senior lieutenant and the school's teacher of Russian language and military instructor. The chapters each cover current activities of the students in studying the division, interspersed with flashbacks to its wartime operations.

This book provides interesting insights into military aspects of the Soviet Union, both directly and by reading between the lines. The complexity and interrelationships of the various Communist Party, military and patriotic organizations within the Soviet school are intriguing. In seeking documents, they were able to find copies of Ministry of Defense "award lists," in order to find which division members had been awarded "Hero of the Soviet Union," but no mention is made of them finding the periodic after action reports (though extensive segments of these reports of divisions are frequently encountered in books published by Voenizdat). The descriptions of the battle sites visited apparently show that many areas of the Soviet Union are still covered with trenches and decrepit bunkers, and have not reverted to agricultural use. East of Vitebsk, an area in cropland during the war is now covered with woods. While in the vicinity of the battle sites, the students encountered old people, children and a few hunters, but they seem to have met few farmers.

This book's unusual emphasis on the procedures and problems of what amounts to military intelligence work within the Soviet Union should make it both interesting and informative for most readers.

James F. Goff



Soviet Perceptions of U.S. Foreign Policy: A Study of Ideology, Power, and Consensus, by John Lenczowski, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1982, 275 pp. plus notes and index, \$25.00.

Mr. Lenczowski excels in his presentation of Soviet attitudes toward U.S. foreign policy. In this new book, he raises the question of the influence of Soviet ideology on attitudes toward the United States. Briefly, he concludes that Marxist-Leninist ideology is still a foundation stone for the development of Soviet political views.

The author, a State Department official and part-time University of Maryland professor, initiates his study by asking four central questions. First, what is the strength of the United States in relation to the Soviet Union? Second, is all the dissent in the Soviet Union crushed, or is it possible for varying political views to exist? Third, can apparent differences of opinion in Soviet politics be traced to distinctive political groups? Finally, what is the impact of ideology on Soviet policy?

In order to answer these inquiries, Lenczowski explores Soviet newspapers, official papers, and periodicals. His selections cover a wide variety of publications from the Nixon-Ford era, which the author feels is a vital period in Soviet-U.S. relations because of the dynamic nature of that recent time. Recognizing the lack of politically significant forces outside of the government, Lenczowski has studied documents which are likely to present the accepted party views. He requests the reader's acceptance of his position that Soviet-approved publications do render an accurate statement of prevailing perceptions and are not merely fantasies conjured up to impress the Soviet public. Acceptance or rejection of the validity of this book rests on a response to the author's request. If his assumption is not accepted, the evidence he presents is of little value. Most analysts will accept the author's basic position on his vital issue.

Lenczowski concludes that there is a simple, dominating Marxist-Leninist ideology which governs expression in Soviet official sources. However, he points out that two schools exist which emphasize dif-

ferent aspects of Soviet-U.S. relationships. These groups he labels Traditionalists and Realists.

The Traditionalists continue to propound the same concepts of the West that Lenin used. They are wary of the imperialist U.S. policies. They believe public opinion plays no part in U.S. politics and that the U.S. leaders are steering the people against their will. In the realm of foreign policy, the Traditionalists see U.S. endeavors as strong and ruthless; the U.S. defeat in Vietnam was not due to U.S. weakness, but to Soviet strength. This group has a slight edge in political power, but not enough to rule without cooperation. With the control they possess, they work toward isolating the Soviet Union from foreign influences and restricting propaganda to their own particular views.

The Soviet Realists are a more modern and cooperative group intellectually. Rather than harping on the usual differences between the Soviet Union and her enemies, Realists recognize Western accomplishments more. This group realizes that some effective exchange does exist between the U.S. government and the public. The more optimistic Realists feel the Soviet Union can recover from its economic problems, which the Traditionalists ignore. The Realists look toward the continuing rise of Soviet military power for the key to the future. Finally, instead of emphasizing the Soviet Union's strengths, they look at U.S. weaknesses. Specifically, they feel the United States has a spineless foreign policy and the communists won the Vietnam war because of U.S. weakness.

So, Soviet ideological differences do exist, but how serious are they? According to Lenczowski, the differences are minimal. We, as opponents to the communist system, strain to notice cracks in the fortress. This tendency obscures the solid doctrinal base provided by Marxist-Leninist ideology. The book's author says that to view the situation accurately, we should look for similarities in the Soviet perceptions of U.S. foreign policy. He suggests that both views agree substantially. For example, the Realists feel that the Soviet Union should have an active foreign policy (i.e. SALT, detente, foreign trade) because it allows her to keep ahead

of the weak U.S. policy. The Traditionalist, on the other hand, support the same actions because they believe the United States should be held in check to prevent contamination of communist or potentially communist countries by U.S. imperialist influence.

In conclusion, Lenczowski portrays a strong, unified Marxist-Leninist ideological base for Soviet perceptions of U.S. foreign policy. The author supports his conclusion with substantial evidence from reliable sources. More significantly, the book demonstrates constant proof of careful consideration of the factors involved. This is an excellent work.

**2nd Lt. Robert D. McMichael
Co. G, USAICS**

Intelligence Policy and National Security, Edited by Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Uri Raanan and Warren H. Milberg, Archon Books, Hamden, Conn., 318 pp. \$32.50

Intelligence Policy and National Security is a highly readable collection of 23 essays which review intelligence operations and policy presented in a format not commonly found without accompanying news media or fictional hyperbole. Perhaps the only shortcoming of the book is the attempt at covering such a diversity of topics, some in a very limited manner.

Important segments include John Erickson's *"The Soviet Military Potential for Surprise Attack: Surprise, Superiority and Time,"* Richard Pipes' *"American Perceptions and Misperceptions of Soviet Military Intentions and Capabilities,"* and William E. Colby's *"Deception and Surprise: Problems of Analysts and Analysis."* Two other key articles are Richard Perle's *"SALT II: Who is Deceiving Whom?"* and Richard K. Betts' *"American Strategic Intelligence: Policies, Priorities, and Direction."*

With the current state of uncertainty in world affairs, Betts writes that "intelligence analyses that have the most impact on decisionmakers must take risks with their own credibility. Impact comes from jolting originality,

willingness to go out on a limb and not rub the sharp edges off an appraisal . . ."

Richard Pipes writes on a very real problem facing U.S. intelligence organizations attempting to collect information on the Soviet Union: that of attempting collection against a closed society. Pipes feels the U.S. intelligence community has built an over-reliance on mechanical ways of obtaining intelligence, with a proportional decline in the analysis of the meaning of the raw intelligence data collected. He writes that "We quantify in order to demonstrate the accuracy of some statements. Qualification is an aid to thinking but it is not reality. Intelligence must be based on human understanding that results from deep knowledge of concrete situations and experience with given societies." Most professional analysts would agree with this.

William Colby's essay should be read by every analyst and intelligence personnel manager. Colby advocates that the advice of one of America's wisest analysts, Sherman Kent, should be adopted—intelligence analysts should be organized geographically rather than functionally where political analysts, economists and military experts are working independently of each other. But, more importantly, is the fact that Colby firmly believes the intelligence community must not only accept responsibility for delivering an effective analysis to the decisionmaker's desk, but also to ensure that it goes into the minds of decisionmaking officials and is used by them to launch policies and programs.

Perhaps, by reading through and heeding the advice of this collection of 23 "food for thought" essays for members of the U.S. intelligence community and intelligence consumers, we will be able to avoid Pearl Harbors of future. One can only hope there will be solutions to a continuing dilemma.

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Branch Regimental System

by 1st Lt. Robert T. Hosman

For most of its history the United States Army has had the regiment as one of its units of organization. In the early years, it was the center of all military and social activities for an army that was at peace more than it was at war. At the beginning of this century, technological advances in transportation and weaponry mushroomed warfare to a size that required larger organizations. The corps and division replaced the regiment as the standard organizational unit, not just tactically, but traditionally as well. Soldiers were no longer members of the 20th Infantry Regiment, they were members of the 101st Airborne Division. The traditions of the old regiments began to die. In 1961, in an effort to shore up some of those time-honored traditions, a number of parent regiments for all active Army, Reserve and National Guard combat units were designated. These parent regiments served the modern line battalions as a link with the past for their lineage and honors. These parent regiments, however, were never staffed or manned, they simply existed only on paper.

Through the years, there have been a number of rumblings and proposals at DA to develop a regimental system based on the British model. In 1980, the COHORT replacement system was implemented on a trial basis. Current trends indicate the combat arms will continue to move toward a fully developed regimental system to obtain some of the benefits that such a system can bring, including: reduced personnel turbulence, better recruiting and more continuity in career management.

A problem that has yet to be addressed is: how are combat support and combat service support to be included in the new American Regimental System? The individual branch schools will be of great significance.

The branch schools will not only serve as training centers and a focus for specific branch doctrinal development and review, but will also coordinate regimental affairs and eventually provide input for the career management of the branch's officers and enlisted soldiers. The responsibility for the regimental affairs and personnel management will directly fall on the regimental headquarters (RHQ).

The placement of various RHQs should be given careful consideration. Ideally an RHQ should be located with an active, Guard or Reserve subordinate unit in CONUS. At least one RHQ needs to be located at each of the three corps headquarters locations in the U.S. (Forts Bragg, Hood and Lewis). Others can be located on divisional posts as needed.

These regiments should be large, preferably six battalion size units plus separate companies and detachments, scattered throughout the world. At least 50 percent of the battalions and companies in a regiment should be Reserve and National Guard units which cover areas large enough to serve as a solid recruiting base.

A retired colonel (O-6) will be recalled to serve as the regimental commander. A major will serve as the regimental area recruiting officer and regimental chief of staff. He will have a full staff of captains and master sergeants working for him and a full-time regimental historian.

This staff will guard the regimental traditions, publish a regimental paper and guide the careers of the officers and enlisted soldiers of the regiment, to include serving every other tour in one of the regimental units somewhere in the world.

Locations are not as important, however, as people. An MI company could be moved in mass from Panama to CONUS as long as MILPERCEN had previously programmed linguists to come with the replacement company. To be sure, an overlap time is necessary in an overseas assignment, but not more than six weeks, so long as all family members and household goods have been previously shipped so soldiers returning to CONUS spend their time teaching the new unit and not outprocessing.

In this way there would be a system of unit rotation (battalion- and company-size units) and individual transfers based on recruiting and advanced school requirements.

A possible career in the fictitious 1001st MI Regiment would look like this for an enlisted soldier:

This soldier has served in almost every battalion in his regiment. He has not changed jobs every six months, but has spent a long period of time working in his primary MOS. When he became an NCO he spent many years as a squad/section leader and then a platoon sergeant.

He became a first sergeant in the same battalion in which he had been a platoon sergeant. His superiors and subordinates knew him and what to expect of him. In return, the new first sergeant knew the soldiers in the unit. He had worked with or been acquainted with a large portion of those individuals for

years. When he finally becomes the regimental S3 NCO he is well-acquainted with the units and the individuals of his regiment.

He retires at Fort Lewis, Wash., in a home he purchased on his second tour and has rented out to other NCOs.

One of his sons is attending the U.S. Military Academy at West Point and has been recruited to the 1001st MI

Regiment. Another son is serving a four-year enlistment with the 3/1001st which is the current "home battalion." He will go on to college and a civilian career when his enlistment is over, but wanted the experience of serving in his father's regiment. He will probably stay in the Regimental Reserves.

The regimental system has a great number of assets from which the Army can profit. It

would be a waste for the combat arms to receive all the benefits when with just a little imagination it can also be applied to the combat support and combat service support units. More than ever, the Army needs to become a profession and not just a job. The American Regimental System can be the key.



Reserve summer intelligence school offered

The 36th annual Fifth U.S. Army Area Intelligence School will open on 12 June 1983 at Fort McCoy, Wisc. and will operate in two-week sessions until 5 August 1983. The school is in its 17th year of operations at Fort McCoy which is located between Tomah and Sparta, with the nearest commercial air terminal being at LaCrosse, Wisc. The Office of Intelligence and Security, Headquarters, Fifth Army, is responsible for the Area Intelligence School, which is staffed entirely by reservists and operational only during the summer months. The school's mission is to provide intelligence training to reserve component personnel, with emphasis on intelligence MOS qualification. The curriculum also includes specialized, non-MOS producing intelligence courses to meet the needs of the

command. Instruction presented is accredited by the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School, Fort Huachuca, Ariz., and closely parallels resident courses presented there. The following courses will be offered during CY 83: Tactical Intelligence Staff Officer SSI 35A; Intelligence Analyst MOS 96B, 964A; Interrogator MOS 96C, 973A; Counterintelligence Officer/Technician/Agent SSI/MOS 36A, 971A, 97B offered in four two-week phases with phase IV (the SIGSEC phase) exclusively for 36A Counterintelligence Officers; S2 Combat Operations (unphased); and Security Manager (unphased). Questions concerning the Fifth U.S. Army Area Intelligence School should be directed to Mr. Lopez or Capt. Cary; Autovon 471-5516/4907; or commercial (512) 221-5516/4907.

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